GLOBALIZING PROPERTY

PRIYA S. GUPTA*

ABSTRACT
Property is more than domestic.
It is international,
transnational, and global. Its reach, its consequences, and its ideas
can rarely be theorized effectively or contained entirely within
national borders. It is produced through encounters between actors
from multiple jurisdictions, and by law from multiple sources. It is
not stable or static. It is contested and ever evolving. Common law
property is not neutral or ahistoric. It was formed in particular
moments, and it benefits particular constellations of power.
Beginning with a history of several significant moments of
property-related conflicts between foreign property claimants and
domestic property holders, the Article puts forward the argument
that these conflictual encounters constitute the basis for the
formation of common law property thought as understood today.
The development of property thought is then traced not as a linear
trajectory without regard to the concrete historical and geographical
circumstances, but rather as operating in the midst of different
phases of socio-economic transformation. In examining that
genealogy, and in placing property doctrine in a globalized
sociological and political economic context, this Article attempts to
reveal how the current moment of financial capitalism has
mobilized a significant ceding of sovereignty and accountability to
private actors through—often taken-for-granted—common law
property regimes.

* Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. My immense gratitude to Amy
Cohen, Frank Upham, and Peer Zumbansen for their thoughtful comments and
engagement with this project.
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Given property law’s ambivalent position between a
constitutional right and a core token in private regulatory
governance, a study of ‘transnational property’ invites two related
reflections. First, that property, when studied from a transnational
perspective, is a norm which is constantly operationalized, fought
over, and stipulated against a background of shifting sovereignty
claims between public actors and private agents. Second, property
law, in its historical and geographical formation, has always been
both transnational and ‘hybrid.’ It must be appreciated against the
background of historical contingency, involving past and present
assertions of might and superiority and resulting in disturbing
patterns of legal export, transplant, and intervention. A fresh look
at the transnational origins and dimensions of property law today
furthermore promises to shed new light on the effect that property
law has had on differently situated stakeholders and reveals how
transnational property legal regimes continue to be sites of conflict
and struggle.
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“Rational concern for the production and sharing of wealth and other
values either in the United States or in other countries cannot today
stop short with the political boundaries of the contemporary nationstate.”1
Myres McDougal
David Haber
“How far can law still be thought of in terms of distinct systems when
new or newly important forms of powerful, authoritative regulation are
created outside—or at least are not limited within—the jurisdictions of
nation-states . . . ? How far is it becoming realistic to think of law in
terms of diverse, intersecting, interacting networks of regulation rather
than self-contained systems?”2
Roger Cotterrell

1
See MYRES MCDOUGAL & DAVID HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND:
ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT: SELECTED CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION 1156 (1948) [hereinafter
MCDOUGAL & HABER].
2
See ROGER COTTERRELL, SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE: JURISTIC THOUGHT AND
SOCIAL INQUIRY (2017).
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1. PROPERTY LAW, TRANSNATIONAL: LAW OUT OF CONFLICT
The first quote above from American legal scholars Myres
McDougal and David Haber is from their property law textbook,
published in 1948 when they were professors at Yale Law School.3
The second quote, from English legal scholar Roger Cotterrell, is
from a monograph published just shy of seventy years later. That
resources and the law that governs them are globalized and not
“self-contained” evidently still needs to be argued explicitly.
This Article traces the idea of property law—the law that
governs resources—as a product of globalized legal thought,
practice, and encounters. While the approach to a distinctly
globalized framing of property appears to be of recent emergence,
this Article starts from the premise that current common law
conceptions of property and doctrinal frameworks are by definition
transnational, which, as a first matter, implies that they were largely
formed as a result of encounters 4 between domestic and foreign
actors. In that regard, the proposition made here is that laws and
norms that inform current debates over cross-border claims to
property—including foreign acquisition of agricultural land (land
grabs),5 the control of natural resources,6 or investor-state dispute

MCDOUGAL & HABER, supra note 1.
On the idea of “encounter” as international law-producing, see Sundhya
Pahuja, Laws Of Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account Of International Law, 1 LONDON
REV. INT’L L. 63 (2013) (describing international law as a law of encounter and
showing how the actualization of the state is an ongoing project of international
law.).
5
See, e.g., Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics
of Food, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 101 (2013); LORENZO COTULA, THE GREAT AFRICAN LAND
GRAB?: AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS AND THE GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM (2013).
6
For literature surrounding the often-referenced compendium of mining
companies and the control of natural resources, see ROGER MOODY, THE GULLIVER
FILE: MINES, PEOPLE, AND LAND: A GLOBAL BATTLEGROUND (1992); Anthony
Bebbington, The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes?, in 49
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 12-20 (2009); Al Gedick, Resource Wars against
Native People in Colombia, 54 CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM 85 (2003); Todd Gordon
& Jeffery R. Webber, Imperialism and Resistance: Canadian Mining Companies in Latin
America, 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 63 (2008); Sundhya Pahuja, Conserving the World’s
Resources?, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 388-420 (James
Crawford & Martti Koskeniemmi eds., 2012).
3
4
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settlement (ISDS) 7 —must be studied against a complex global
historical and geopolitical background.
In other words, a starting assertion of the following analysis is
that property law and thought are ever-evolving and involve a global
set of actors and ideas. 8 Admittedly, to some readers who
intuitively engage with all law as operating in a global context, this
argument will seem fairly obvious, albeit under-explored in current
property law literature. To others, however, it will likely not. Many
American property law casebooks treat property law as nearly
entirely constituted through domestic legal processes and
substantive law.9 Coverage of topics such as takings, trespass, racial
7
See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW
(2008) [hereinafter VAN HARTEN 2008]; M. SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2015).
8
See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY (2014)
(describing the origins and evolution of property rights developed in the
international). On the challenges that globalization presents for domestic property
regimes, see AMNON LEHAVI, PROPERTY LAW IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (2019)
(examining various doctrinal areas in property and “strategies” to adapt to crossborder activities). On property rights of states under public international law, see
Peter Tzeng, The State’s Right to Property Under International Law, 125 YALE L.J. 1805
(2015) (describing States rights and international controversies concerning property
rights under international law).
9
See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY (7th ed. 2010); THOMAS W.
MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2d ed. 2012); JOHN
G. SPRANKLING, & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
(4th ed. 2018). This is not to say that there are not any comparative references to
doctrine or scholarship from outside the United States. Merrill and Smith, for
example, have a number of comparisons throughout the text. However, the concern
that this Article seeks to address is that it remains under-appreciated that American,
and other systems, property doctrines and thought are constituted through their
global context.
This is also not to argue that the authors themselves see property this way. For
example, casebook author John Sprankling has several projects on property under
public international law, and Gregory Alexander has engaged in a number of
comparative law projects. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
PROPERTY (2014); JOHN G. SPRANKLING, RAYMOND R. COLETTA, & M.C. MIROW,
GLOBAL ISSUES IN PROPERTY LAW (2006); GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE
OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
(2006); Gregory S. Alexander, Comparing the Two Legal Realisms—American and
Scandinavian, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 131 (2002).
Rather, the lack of engagement that this Article wishes to draw attention to in
first-year casebooks only underscores the power of the belief that first-year law
students should learn the “law” of property, which would not include global
influences, events, theory, or doctrine.
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discrimination, land use, and foreclosure, for example, include little
reference to legal thought and practice outside of national
boundaries or of global influences or events.10
The exception may be limited references to English common law and thought
(and the rare mention of Roman law), but even those generally portray the
constitution of property doctrine as a linear one-way process—with new Americans
instituting their own variations on what they wanted to adapt from original English
common law (for example, ridding themselves of the fee tail or in their treatment
of equity), rather than an ongoing dialogue and constitution. Even treatments of
Johnson v. M’Intosh—by its nature a transnational case (as discussed in Part II),
generally do not engage with the idea of American Empire, or even of the case as
an account of encounter between two sovereign powers.
10
Alternatively, seeing property in global contexts could mean the following:
Takings law could include discussion on the influence of foreign investors and
foreign investment law. See discussion infra Part II. It should be noted here that
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 9, at 1211-18, does include a brief discussion of
government forbearance in the context of Foreign Investment Treaties.
A trespass case often used in casebooks, State v. Shack, involved migrant workers
living on the farm on which they worked and denied access to aid workers by their
employer. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). The geopolitical context in
which they ended up working and living on the farm of an authoritarian employer
is significant in understanding the New Jersey aid program at issue and the
precarious situation of the workers. See id.
Desegregation has its own history of foreign relations and international pressure
rarely found in first-year curricula. Shelley v. Kraemer, the 1948 Supreme Court case
that prohibited racially restrictive covenants in property sales had an amicus curiae
brief on behalf of the United States which had the following quote from then-Acting
Secretary of State Dean Acheson:
“The existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country
has an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries. We are
reminded over and over by some foreign newspapers and spokesmen, that
our treatment of various minorities leaves much to be desired . . . .
Frequently we find it next to impossible to formulate a satisfactory answer
to our critics in other countries . . . .
An atmosphere of suspicion and resentment in a country over the way a
minority is being treated in the United States is a formidable obstacle to
the development of mutual understanding and trust between the two
countries. We will have better international relations when these reasons
for suspicion and resentment have been removed.”
See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STANFORD L. REV. 61,
101 (1988) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19-20, Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)). Derrick Bell famously termed the Cold War pressure to
desegregate that resulted in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education “[i]nterest[c]onvergence” between white people and black people. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518
(1980).
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The transnational context of how property law came to be is all
but ignored. The political pressure on the framers of the U.S.
Constitution to conform with other common law constitutions 11
centuries ago is invisibilized. The Cold War pressures to end the
most obvious forms of legal racial discrimination are not addressed.
The increased presence and power of foreign investors exercising
influence on property as well as property law does not appear. This
Article’s primary goal is to speak against the grain of that powerful
orthodoxy of strict domestically-informed analysis.
The orientation offered here situates property law doctrine in a
wide context of state formation, colonialism, development, as well
as foreign direct investment. Similar to concurring research in
company 12 or commercial law, 13 the central interest here is to
identify methods of analyzing property which bring those
sociological and political-economic contexts more directly into legal
discourse.
In situating property in global context, the following here
reveals the opacity of private power in governance of and around
property. In doing so, it draws first from Legal Realism and its
progeny. However, both the nature of property ownership as well
as the legal and regulatory webs around property have changed
dramatically since the time of their writing in the first half of the
twentieth century as the global economy has become increasingly
financialized. First, the nature of global financial flows and related
Land use treatments could include pressures that local governments face to exercise
their power to zone in favor of foreign investors and their local activities. Finally,
discussion of the foreclosure crisis could include accounts of how it was inherently
global in nature because of the nature of investment in U.S. mortgage-backed
securities, the global adoption of U.S. forms of real estate-related financial
instruments.
11
See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830 5-6
(2005) (stating that “Overseas, provincial New Yorkers successfully used those
components of common-law constitutionalism upholding local autonomy, which
forced the imperial agents to search for a separate imperial law. But the agents’
attempts to create it helped precipitate rebellion, and today they are forgotten.”).
12
See, e.g., Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership,
62 MODERN L. REV. 32 (1999).
13
See generally ROY GOODE, HERBERT KRONKE, & EWAN MCKENDRICK,
TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS (2nd ed. 2015);
Clive M. Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial
Transactions, in 2 THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 19-31 (Norbert Horn & Clive M. Schmitthoff eds., 1982).
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claims of property ownership (and therefore, as will be explored, of
governance) across jurisdictional borders stretch the marketoriented power analyses of Realists past their limits.
Second, the spatial disruption of jurisdictional borders more
generally—from those that govern intellectual property, to those
that govern online activities, to those which determine tax
liabilities—call for a revision of place-based notions of property
ownership.
Third, compounding that disruption of spatial jurisdictional
borders is the increasing blurring of legal fields as property-related
phenomena such as, international real estate markets, rest on
regulatory webs of finance, land use, property ownership, and
immigration, to name a few.
Finally, the ongoing legacy of conquest and colonial
encounters—as manifested in, for example, indigenous claims over
territory, uneven bargaining power in the World Trade
Organization, or international pressure on Global South countries to
enact or refrain from enacting certain regulatory regimes—calls for
a retelling of how taken-for-granted doctrines in common law
property (such as expropriation) came to be.
Many of the property doctrines that are apparently taken for
granted and exported or imposed through economic development
efforts and other forms of international politics and law are treated
as if they are neutral or scientific-like principles not in need of social
or historical contextualization. Indeed, one leading American
property casebook declares,
With a tip of the hat to Hayek, we can call the older property
rights in land and personal property that have been around
for so long no one remembers how they got started
“spontaneous” or “grown” orders of property rights, and the
newer, deliberately created schemes “made” orders of
property rights.14
This Article seeks to remind us, if not of the precise events, then
at least of the constellations of power through which enduring
notions in property “got started” and through which they are
perpetuated. This requires engaging with both the histories of
14
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 9, at 1107, citing 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW
LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 35-54 (1973).
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property doctrines (Part II) and new methodologies (Part III). By
putting the insights of Legal Realists and their legal pluralist
progeny in conversation with indigenous legal and postcolonial
legal theory as well as urban sociology and legal geography, this
Article aims to show how (i) common law property thought has a
long history of formation as a result of encounters with other
systems of law and norms, and (ii) that understanding property in
this sociological, political-economic, and historic context has
significant implications for how common law property is employed
today, namely with respect to unsettling assumptions around who
gets to use property, who gets to determine the rights associated
with that use, and what purposes property regimes should serve.
Said differently, this Article attempts to further the Legal Realist
project of revealing law as a constellation of non-neutral, political
choices that must be understood in societal contexts and
postcolonial legal theory’s commitment to unsettling dominant legal
orthodoxies by retelling their colonial histories, tracing those
ongoing legacies, and showing the ever-evolving global context of
common law property doctrine and thought, its historical
contingencies and contradictions, and its political formations and
distributional consequences.
Roger Cotterrell, whose insight as to the spatial disruption of
regulatory regimes opened this Article, captures the motivation for
an expanded frame of analysis as follows:
[J]urisprudence needs new resources. It must take full
account of the social and political contexts in which
problems about system, authority and plurality arise if it is
to adapt to address effectively the developing transnational
and international dimensions of law . . . Law’s authority has
long been parasitic on the political authority of the state,
legitimated by democratic processes.15
But, as he notes, in the current world and state of law, “this may
no longer be sufficient.”16 What is needed, therefore, is “to consider
more carefully how authority can arise and the various forms it can
take.” 17 He advocates, therefore, for a sociologically-informed
15
16
17

Id.
Id.
Id.
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jurisprudence, which would “reveal[ ] authority being created in
patterns of social interaction not necessarily regulated or supervised
the state and often unknown to or ignored or misunderstood by
state officials and jurists.”18
These questions resonate with property law-related inquiries.
Whether the question is of title claims in the settler-colonial
context,19 the threatened extinction of community uses of land as a
consequence of a resource extraction license, 20 or the eviction of
‘illegal’ long-time squatters from the pavement under the auspices
of ‘urban renewal,’ ‘modernization,’ and ‘beautification,’21 property
law claims carry in themselves a range of conflicting rights, but in
fact more, namely an entire universe of political-normative claims
regarding the desired social (and economic) order. 22 Seeing the
plurality—as well as the permeability—of property and relatedly,
the diverse sites of authority to govern it invites re-thinking of even
entrenched property doctrines toward enable more equitable
distribution and access.
A word of clarification concerning the use of the term
‘transnational’ and its multi-dimensional meaning: this Article takes
as a starting point the term as it is often used to demarcate the global
interactions of private actors, whether in the domains of lex
mercatoria, through social movements, or in other constellations as
they occur on across jurisdictional borders.23 It also engages with
the idea of the ‘transnational’ more specifically as it refers to the
overlapping jurisdiction of laws occupying different, often
Id.
See, e.g., LARISSA BEHRENDT, ACHIEVING SOCIAL JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
AND AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE (2003); John Borrows, Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis
of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 537 (1999); Douglas C.
Harris, Property and Sovereignty: An Indian Reserve and a Canadian City, 50 U.B.C. L.
REV. 321 (2017).
20
See POOJA PARMAR, INDIGENEITY AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN INDIA: CLAIMS,
HISTORIES, MEANINGS (2015).
21
See Okhla Factory Owners Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi,
(2002) 108 DLT 517 (Delhi HC); Priya S. Gupta, Judicial Constructions: Modernity,
Economic Liberalization, and the Urban Poor in India, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 25 (2014).
22
On the plural purposes of property, in particular its value as a social
institution, see JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY,
AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (2010).
23
See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); Peer Zumbansen,
Transnational Law, Evolving, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 898-925
(Jan M. Smits ed., 2nd ed. 2012).
18
19

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

622

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:3

sometimes competing regulatory spaces24 and as it is applied to the
tension between jurisdictional and spatial demarcations.25 In that
sense, transnational law is treated here as a method, rather than a field
of law. 26 While the latter would imply a “distinct regulatory
purpose and a particular set of doctrinal rules and principles”,27 the
former conceives of transnational law as a means of studying the
evolution of legal actors, norms, and processes in a global context:
[T]ransnational law is at once a legal-theoretical,
methodological framework through which processes and
actors of legal norm generation are scrutinized in local and
global contexts . . . while it is also a critical project that seeks
to understand the conditions under which invocations of
‘law’ are made, contested and resisted. This intersection of a
theory of transnational norm making with a critique of law
and rights in a global context is at the heart of transnational
law and thus reveals its affinities with areas, where scholars
increasingly turn their attention to questions of ‘sources’ of
law, to the actual processes of norm generation and norm
contestation and to the wide variety of actors involved.28

24
For example, while company law and labor law are both fields which in
reality relate to an integrated corporate environment, doctrinally they are treated
separately. For an in-depth discussion of this fragmentation and overlap, see
generally Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of
Comparative Law as a Critique of Global Governance, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN
COMPARATIVE LAW (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2012).
25
For example, the demarcations of national jurisdictions that attempt to
regulate online content, versus the reality of the Internet’s existence in a space that
defies those very borders.
26
See Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law: Theories and Applications, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Peer Zumbansen, ed., forthcoming)
[hereafter Zumbansen, Introduction].
27
Peer Zumbansen, The Continuing Search for Law in a Globally Interconnected
World: Engaging and Contextualizing Jessup’s ‘Transnational Law,’ in JESSUP’S BOLD
PROPOSAL. CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH ‘TRANSNATIONAL LAW’ at 42 (Peer
Zumbansen ed., 2020).
28
See Peer Zumbansen, The Continuing Search for Law in a Globally
Interconnected World: Engaging and Contextualizing Jessup’s ‘Transnational Law,’ in
JESSUP’S BOLD PROPOSAL. CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH ‘TRANSNATIONAL LAW’ at 34
(Peer Zumbansen ed., 2020); see also Peer Zumbansen, What Lies Before, Behind and
Beneath a Case? Five Minutes on Transnational Lawyering and the Consequences for Legal
Education, in STATELESS LAW: EVOLVING BOUNDARIES OF A DISCIPLINE (Helge Dedek &
Shauna Van Praagh eds., 2016).
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In understanding transnational law as a method and in engaging
with research questions around norm formation and contestation,
two further dimensions of research orientation become clearer: that
an interdisciplinary framework is necessary to appreciate historical,
political, and social contexts that create law; and that doctrinal areas
are not as easy to separate as they may first appear—emerging
regulatory regimes cross numerous doctrinal areas and do not easily
lend themselves to a unified conceptualization.29
With that in mind, to “globalize” or “transnationalize” property
involves the simultaneous treatment of multiple several critical and
disciplinary investigations. First, the doctrinal frames of property
law are reassessed in terms of how boundaries are created between
property law and concurring regulatory areas such as contract law,
constitutional law, and investment law. That investigation further
reveals the embeddedness of each of these frameworks in both
implicit and explicit assumptions regarding the prevailing socioeconomic and political order as a whole.30 Second, from this follows
that one is confronted not with just one, however conceptually
coherent ‘liberal’ theory of property (and a concurring historical
narrative to provide the necessary factual evidence), but—instead—
with a host of, in themselves, distinct as well as overlapping
genealogies of transnational property law development.
Third, this Article will focus primarily on property rights related
to land to illustrate how even a certain type of property that appears
to be rooted in and bound to a particular, jurisdictionally specific
place (immovable property), 31 is nevertheless entangled in the
29 See infra Part III’s discussion of legal pluralism; see also Carrie MenkelMeadow, Why and How to Study Transnational Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 97 (2011);
Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERS 3, 42-44 (Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015);
Zumbansen, Introduction, supra note 26.
30
For an elaboration of the idea of relating doctrinal frameworks to the
political economy in which they are operating and invoked, see Zumbansen,
Introduction, supra note 26.
For significant political economic analyses of property law and thought, see
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY
IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1998); FRANK K. UPHAM, THE GREAT
PROPERTY FALLACY: THEORY, REALITY, AND GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(2018); see also EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975).
31
On the tensions wrought by the representation of land on paper from
memory and maps to contract to title and records, see Alain Pottage, The Measure of
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evolution of competing global property regimes. The following
investigation will furthermore show how, in relation to land, what
aspects—material and cultural—are captured by a concept of
‘property law,’ which rights and obligations are tied up in the notion
and principle of ownership, and how in each the struggle over—and
evolution of—diverting justifications for those rights is found.
Fourth and finally, in using the idea of long-standing and
overlapping genealogies of property claims in a transnational,
border-crossing context, and in employing an interdisciplinary
method of analysis, this Article shows how dominant ideas in
property continue to emerge in various historically-contingent
circumstances and then are exported and adapted through time and
place. With that understanding, it offers an analytical method of
moving outside of dominant frames of understanding property law
and seeing its plurality and its operation ‘on the ground.’ These
dynamics are traced through colonial, economic development, and
international political, legal, and investment encounters into the
present day and its complex struggles over political and economic
equality, environmental sustainability and cultural recognition—all
of which appear to be caught up in disputes over ‘property.’32 The
aim here is not to generalize all of property as part of one story or
system, but rather to decenter an account of how one constellation
of property regimes—that of common law property—in order to
demonstrate how it has been shaped by multiple encounters of
actors across jurisdictional borders and the normative-regulatory
regimes that grew out of these encounters.
The critical account provided here is primarily one of common
law. 33 This is justified in light of the many ways in which the
Land, 57 THE MODERN L. REV. 361, 362 (1994) (exploring that transformation of
representation, which the author argues “reduc[ed] the dimensions of juridical
ownership to paper” through contract, and with the subsequent introduction of title
and registration, “rendered property and topography commensurable, reducing
each to a form of notation which could be accommodated to or superimposed upon
the other”).
32
See, e.g., POOJA PARMAR, INDIGENEITY AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN INDIA: CLAIMS,
HISTORIES, MEANINGS (2015); VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE
AND KNOWLEDGE (1997).
33
A truly transnational view of property should engage more deeply with
Asian and civil law property regimes, those of the former U.S.S.R., indigenous laws,
and other common, civil, and other legal regimes in Latin America and Africa.
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common law of property continues to be promulgated by
international financial institutions and other powerful international
actors in both international and domestic regimes,34 and also with
regard to common law property thought’s claim to an almost
ahistorical prominence.35
Part II puts this argument in historical context. It opens with a
brief reflection on the stakes involved in appreciating property in a
globalized, transnational context before tracing several foundational
moments of the establishment of property theory in history. The
dynamic of transnational property can be traced back centuries—
from Roman law36 to conquest and colonialism and more recently to
development and investment regimes, as they unfold against an
intricate multiplication of interests and issues. Given the sprawling
nature of this task, one can only point to a number of representative
instances in such a timeline. The modest aim here, rather than
following the thread through each particular reference point, is
instead to argue for reorientation of our perception. In other words,
this Article will attempt to shift our gaze to the plurality of
evolutionary thread(s), as they form the background for each
concrete encounter with “property.” This, this Article will do by
singling out three landmark but also ongoing moments of property
encounters and lawmaking: conquest, colonialism & development,
and international investment.
In search of a better grasp of the nature of the evolving property
law regimes in a transnational context, particular emphasis is placed
on the way in which often violent encounters between certain actors
are the outset of newly formulated as well as rejected property law
Limitations of scope and expertise have limited this Chapter primarily to common
law regimes in the United States, Canada, Australia, and India, and to influences
found in transnational law. It is this author’s hope that future projects can engage
with a wider variety of legal traditions.
34
See, e.g., David Kennedy, Some Caution About Property Rights as a Recipe for
Economic Development, 1 ACCOUNTING, ECON. & L. 1 (2011); Monica Eppinger,
Property and Political Community: Democracy, Oligarchy, and the Case of Ukraine, 47
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 825 (2015); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Exporting The Ownership
Society: A Case Study on the Economic Impact of Property Rights, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 59
(2007).
35
See, e.g., ALEXANDER 1998, supra note 30; PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY
OF MODERN LAW (2002).
36
See Anna DiRobilant, The Building Blocks of European Property Law: The
Roman Conceptual Vocabulary of Property (draft paper, on file with author).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

626

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:3

rules, norms, and principles. Studying these encounters as sites of
law-making highlights the importance of historical facticity and the
contingency in the formation of ‘property law’ and connects this
project to concurring efforts in a growing range of areas to study the
generation of law making from within concrete sites of conflictual
encounter, such as in commercial arbitration and lex mercatoria37 as
well as alternative dispute resolution.38
Once common law property thought is presented as historically
contingent, hybrid, and encompassing a variety of overlapping
doctrines, Part III puts the argument in methodological context.
Drawing on a host of conceptual and analytical frameworks to help
in this endeavor—comparative legal analysis, legal geography, legal
anthropology, the sociology of law, postcolonial theory, and legal
pluralism—it distills four lenses through which it is proposed an
analysis of globalized property regimes should be approached: the
‘diffusion of law’; the plurality of law and its constituent norms;
postcolonial ‘everyday lived’ experiences of urban property; and
law’s proliferation in terms of norm creation and norm
implementation beyond the state.
The analysis concludes in Part IV by returning to the correlation
of sovereignty and property, which has been a well-known staple in
critical legal analysis. With the help of the foregoing critique of
transnational property law regimes as sites of continuing conflict,
one will be able to capture more effectively how the new legal
structures arising out of conflictual encounters can be seen to
perpetuate the allocation of resources with a ‘normalizing’ effect,
rendering them more immune against critique while precluding
more equitable distribution. The power relationships that are
encoded in law through these encounters ultimately determine
access to property and resources. Our analysis will show that
37
Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias
Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L. J. 419 (2000); Ralf Michaels, The
True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 447 (2007).
38
For various discussions on alternative dispute resolution in different
contexts, see, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the
Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51 (2009); Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against
Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1143 (2009); Amy J. Cohen, The Family, The Market, and ADR, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL.
91 (2011); Sari M. Graben, Assessing Stakeholders Participation in Sub-Arctic CoManagement: Administrative Rulemaking and Private Agreements, 29 WINDSOR YB.
ACCESS. JUST. 195 (2011).
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property law’s normalizing tendencies have detrimental
consequences for the way in which societal, racial, class, gender, and
other hierarchies are constituted and institutionalized.
2. HISTORY: LANDMARKS, INEQUITIES, AND CONTINUITIES IN
PROPERTY REGIMES THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL ENCOUNTERS
Property law regarding land, as it located in particular place, is
often theorized within an implied domestic frame.39 Applications of
property law usually refer to the local statutes and law as embedded
within the larger national jurisdiction, and rarely beyond that to
international regimes, or to other jurisdictions. 40 However, the
innumerable instances over centuries of individuals and corporate
and other entities crossing borders (and oceans) and laying claims
to property belie the simplicity of focusing solely on the domestic
jurisdiction of property. It is not just that the domestic jurisdiction
adapts by merely recognizing the ‘owner’ as a foreign entity, but
rather that with that claim and negotiation, new forms of
jurisdiction41 are shaped, new ideas around who can rightfully make
a claim to what and how, new norms around the meaning of
‘ownership,’ and what the actual—explicit or implicit—regulatory
purpose is of a property regime appear to easily cross boundaries,
diffuse, and settle.42 By shifting our attention away from the specific
39
An eloquent exception is Patrick McAuslan, Property and Empire: From
Colonialism to Globalization and Back, 24 SOC. & L. STUD. 339 (2015).
Constitutional law literature that often includes discussions on the crafting of
property clauses, see, e.g., Heinz Klug, Defining the Property Rights of Others: Political
Power, Indigenous Tenure and the Construction of Customary Land Law, 35 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM 119 (1995). Postcolonial and indigenous legal literature will be discussed
below; note engagements with the idea of property as a human or international
right, including SPRANKLING, supra note 8.
40
Courts might engage in comparative analysis when they are faced with a
new issue, but it is rare to see explicit appreciation of the connections between
apparently domestic issues to larger global contexts and patterns in pursuit of legal
solutions.
41
See generally SHAUNNAGH DORSETT & SHAUN MCVEIGH, JURISDICTION (2012)
(providing an overarching discussion the historical development of the concept of
jurisdiction and the various forms that it takes).
42
For an insightful conceptualization of the way in which norms and
regulatory regimes “settle,” see Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 29; see also Terence
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locational jurisdiction of the object of property and, instead, towards
at the processes of the formation of those ideas, one can begin to
discern how property thought and property regimes have been
profoundly shaped by such encounters. This analysis implies that
current differentiation of property law into, say, personal, real, and
intellectual property is but a superficial reflection of the deeper roots
the various dimensions of property law have in historical struggles
and that therefore one ought to review one’s assertions regarding
the different forms of holding property (including owning, renting,
and licensing) as well as the various regulatory regimes associated
with property (for example, those associated with intellectual
property registration, mortgages, investment, and securitization).
This living history of seemingly timeless ideas and evolving
practices around the invocation, rejection, and consolidation of
property claims is necessarily a story of its different actors and their
varying roles within these stories. The property norms that operate
at multiple levels of governance—local, national, international, and
transnational—continue to play key roles in changing policy
priorities of nation-state governments, international organizations,
and global investors. From each vantage point, the stakes of
property differ, as states clamor for foreign capital, and international
development and financial organizations strive for the ideal mix of
support and incentives, while hedge funds, real estate developers,
and private equity pools seek out profitable placement
opportunities with the least possible degree of “red tape” and yet
also certainty regarding legal enforcement of property and contract
claims.43 Property regimes continue to arise, expand, and adapt in
response to these different forces of influence. But, the more
property law regimes are thought of as border-crossing,
“spatialized” realms of economic and actual power,44 questions of
political agency, of accountability, and legitimacy appear to become
more opaque.
Depending on the political economic context in which the
conflict over “property” is carried out, property’s “public”
Halliday, The Recursivity of Law: Global Lawmaking and National Lawmaking in the
Globalization of Bankruptcy, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007).
43
See, e.g., DOREEN MASSEY, WORLD CITY (2007); RAHUL MEHROTRA,
ARCHITECTURE IN INDIA: SINCE 1990 (2011).
44
See, e.g., DOREEN MASSEY, FOR SPACE (2005); SARAH KEENAN, SUBVERSIVE
PROPERTY: LAW AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACES OF BELONGING (2015).
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dimension—what Morris Cohen described in 1927 as property’s
affinity with sovereignty—varies in its visibility.45 For Cohen and
other Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s it was evident that the
concentration of power that results from the allocation of rights to
property to private actors is significant and should therefore be
understood as a form of sovereign power. Building upon insights
from Robert Hale and fellow Legal Realists as well as political
economists of the earlier Progressive Era such as Richard Ely and
John Commons, Cohen argued that those who own property
exercise “power over the life of others” by determining rents, prices,
and even the command of services through their payment for
labor.46 Through taxation and the ability to command services and
the states’ protection of these processes, Cohen’s argument goes,
“we have the essence of what historically has constituted political
sovereignty.”47
The Realists’ analysis, for all the lessons it bears, is not without
its limitations—especially against the background of the type of
state transformation that has come to mark Western nation states in
the second half of the twentieth century. With a wholesale shift
“from government to governance” and an ever-expanding sphere of
private assumption of formerly public services (and assets), the
differences between private power and public authority have
become ambivalent. Over the past few decades, sovereignty has
become further diffused across a plurality of private actors, who in
turn have been taking on more and more of what was formerly
under state responsibility or, at least, effective control. The more
recent critique by scholars such as Claire Cutler and Fleur Johns of
lex mercatoria’s success in rendering real power differentials in the
transnational realm invisible 48 echoes and expands upon the
concerns raised by progressive legal scholars and political scientists

See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927).
Id.
47
Id. at 13.
48
See Fleur Johns, Performing Power: The Deal, Corporate Rule, and the
Constitution of Global Legal Order, 34 J.L. & SOC. 116 (2007); A. Claire Cutler, Legal
Pluralism as the “Common Sense” of Transnational Capitalism, 3 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL
SERIES 719 (2013); A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY:
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003)
[hereinafter CUTLER 2003].
45
46
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a hundred years before with regard to the national context. 49
Building on the critique of market power in the domestic context50
by Legal Realists, this transnational revival of the scrutiny of
“private power” draws attention to how, as observed by Cutler,
“private authority” has remained mostly outside the ambit of critical
(international) law 51 in large part because of the (perceived)
divisions between public and private spheres of law and subjects:
“[t]he authority of corporate law and transnational corporations, the
major agents of corporate power, are minimized by statist political
theories that discount the political significance of such corporations
and by legal theories that do not regard them as legitimate ‘subjects’
or ‘sources’ of law.”52
The divide in perception between public and private and the
disproportionate focus on state-centric conceptions of sovereignty is
an impediment to the development of a viable theory of democratic
accountability vis-à-vis private power. Public International Law
appears, in the face of rapid privatization and market-based and
self-regulation, unable to adequately “check” private power in the
transnational sphere on account of its continued focus on state
agency and its confidence in political accountability even in the
absence of a viable form of global government. 53 Moreover, as
Cutler argues, these private actors are not passively gaining
authority—rather, they are “deeply implicated in the ordering of
state-society relations” in that they “operate to recast ‘public’
concerns as ‘private.’”54 By doing so, they effectively remain outside

49
See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly NonCoercive State, 38 POLI. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial
Minorities, 20 COL. L. REV. 451 (1920); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and
Economic Liberty, 43 COL. L. REV. 603 (1943); John P. Dawson, Unconscionable
Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (1976); John P. Dawson,
Economic Duress: An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253 (1947).
50
See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (2002); Peer Zumbansen,
The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191
(2007).
51
See Fleur Johns, The Invisibility of The Transnational Corporation: An Analysis
of International Law and Legal Theory, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 893 (1994) [hereinafter Johns
1994]; see also discussion in Part I.C. below.
52
CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 5.
53
See Johns 1994, supra note 51; see also discussion in Part I.C. below.
54
CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 5.
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the purview of “democratic methods of scrutiny and review.”55 As
noted, this shift in power and the attending dilemmas regarding
accountability and “public” oversight is a phenomenon occurring
within and beyond the nation state and, as such, a prime example of
what Saskia Sassen referred to as the place “where the work of
globalization gets done.”56 Cutler’s analysis cogently highlights the
connections between the domestic and the transnational and
exposes the limitations of an international legal framework oriented
around state action. On both accounts, one is faced with the result
that while there might be increased awareness of the rise of power
exercised by private actors, the actual diffusion of that power and
the ambivalent status of agency challenges rule-of-law based
concepts of accountability, while the association of private power
with the ordinary business of market functionality effectively
neutralizes political critique.
Despite the critique offered by the Progressives and the Legal
Realists and those whose work follows in their tradition today, the
dominant view that private property is separate from public ideas
of governance remains in place today. That ownership actually
implies an exercise of power over non-owners is rarely accounted
for in property regimes whose underlying values are the protection
of that ownership, rather than the balancing of that power.57 While
political sovereignty has been conceptualized as entwined with the
classic dimensions of control of territory and people, 58 private
exercises of sovereignty over territory and people are far less
accounted for in the law. Balancing the power exercised by private
owners through regulation of use or redistribution of resources is
often seen as an infringement of their private property rights, rather

CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 5.
Saskia Sassen, The Global City: Introducing a Concept, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF.
27, 35 (2005).
57
See Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853
(2012); ALEXANDER 1998, supra note 30.
58
See Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991);
Borrows 1999, supra note 19; Harris 2017, supra note 19. For a critique of the concept
of sovereignty from a postcolonial perspective, see Brenna Bhandar, The Conceit of
Sovereignty: Toward Post-Colonial Technique, in STORIED COMMUNITIES: NARRATIVES OF
CONTACT AND ARRIVAL IN CONSTITUTING POLITICAL COMMUNITY (Hester Lessard et
al. eds., 2011).
55
56
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than an integral part of a property regime.59 This idea is crucial to
the approach to legal analysis offered here. As will be seen below,
once newly-arrived global actors (in current times, mostly private
corporate ones) are able to establish an enforceable claim to land or
other property superior to that of domestic actors who were
previously using that property, a sphere of sovereign control is
created, cities and landscapes shaped, resources are allocated, and
societies are re-ordered, all raising crucial questions of transparency,
accountability, and democratic processes of decision-making in
those transformations.60
The Legal Realists and those who have followed in their
tradition have revealed much concerning the contradictions
inherent in common law regimes and in liberalism more generally.
What the following historical analysis attempts to add is the
significance of the role of conquest and colonialism in shaping
common law property thought and its contradictions—
circumstances that are largely ignored in the Realist canon. One
might consider this relative under-engagement in light of what
postcolonial political theorist Uday Singh Mehta called the
“neglected link” between liberalism and empire. 61 In the very
moment that the British, Dutch, and French “rightly conceived of
themselves as having elaborated and integrated into their societies
of political freedom,” they also “pursued and held vast empires
where such freedoms were either absent or severely attenuated.”62
It is the legacy of those empires (and their underlying justifications)
on property regimes that implicates conquest and colonialism as
ever-relevant to a transnational analysis, and that benefits from
analyses drawn from indigenous and postcolonial legal theories.
Several specific reasons for this engagement can be delineated.
First, the ill-fitted property regimes enacted by colonial powers to
govern their colonial subjects continue to have legacies in current
property regimes in the Global North and Global South, as well as
in regimes that cross their boundaries. Moreover, the acquisition of
property rights—alongside the imposition of common law
59
See ALEXANDER 1998 supra note 30; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, NO
WITHOUT REGULATION: THE HIDDEN LESSON OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2015).

FREEDOM

See CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 13.
See UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTHCENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT (1999).
62
Id. at 7.
60
61
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conceptions of property—played an important role in expanding
conquest and colonial efforts. And relatedly, the re-conception and
acquisition of property rights continue to be of concern today in
areas such as intellectual property that have been criticized as neoimperial. 63 With regards to the legacy of conquest of indigenous
land and peoples on current law, the connection is even more direct,
as the occupation of their land continues today with scarce
reparation.64
Second, the conquest and colonial encounters are integral to this
analysis of property because the underlying assumptions of many
colonial-era property laws continue to be in operation through
international development and investment projects. As has been
well-observed by Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Sundhya Pahuja, M.
Sornarajah and other scholars contributing to theories of “Third
World Approaches to International Law”,65 domestic laws in former
colonies as well as international development projects and
investment arrangements since the post War period in many ways
mark continuities of rather than disjunctures from colonial projects
of dominance and control of powerful groups. The continuity of
exploitation occurs, for example: as natural and other resources are
See discussion supra Part II.
See, e.g., PATRICK MACKLEM, INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION
OF CANADA (2001). For a fascinating theorization of indigenous claims to land and
the imposition of state legal institutions in India, see PARMAR 2015, supra note 32.
For powerful accounts of the ongoing discriminatory treatment of the property and
sovereignty of Native Americans, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON:
THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN
AMERICA (2005); Singer 1991, supra note 58; Jedediah Purdy, Property and Empire: The
Law of Imperialism in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329 (2007).
65
Third World Approaches to International Law re-theorizes public
international law from plural vantage points in the Global South, including by
retelling the history of its making and the significance of colonialism, tracing the
legacies of colonialism in international law today, and critiquing current
development orthodoxy in law and policy. On TWAIL generally, see Makau
Mutua, What is TWAIL? 94 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL ANNUAL MEETING 31 (2000);
Obiora C. Okafor, Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL):
Theory, Methodology, or Both? 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 371 (2008); James T. Gathii,
TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative
Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26 (2011). For specific engagement with how
international development, investment, and public international law continue
colonial legacies of power differentials, elite class structures, and resource
extraction, see Pahuja 2013, supra note 4; BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE
(2003); SORNARAJAH, supra note 7.
63
64
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further siphoned off to the Global North; 66 through
intergovernmental organizations that are meant to encourage fair
multilateral negotiation (such as the WTO) but perpetuate structures
of unequal bargaining between Global North and South;67 and, as
non-reciprocal concessions in trade and investment are made
through coercive demands on Global South for regulatory parity
with Global North states. 68 The network of domestic and
transnational laws that support development projects (such as large
infrastructure construction, extraction of natural resources, and
sovereign debt lending) and legal regimes for investment appear to
be value-neutral and in accordance with “accepted practices” of
common law supporting capital movement and freer trade, despite
the political choices and values that underly them.
Finally and most expansively, the critical engagements of
indigenous and postcolonial theory with the laws of conquest and
colonialism enable one to better see the power differentials and
racial and ethnic inequality between (and within) the Global North
and the Global South, and the entrenchment of those differentials in
law and legal theory. 69 With that appreciation comes an
understanding of the “postcolonial” that is not tied literally to
whether a given place was colonized or not, but rather an
understanding that serves as a lens through which to see
“oppression of all communities historically treated as racially and
ethnically inferior to Europeans.”70
The last point warrants a brief further explanation. How can one
understand the relationship between postcolonial theory and law?
Eve Darian-Smith writes of the efforts of scholars of postcolonial law
See discussion supra note 6, for further discourse on mining.
For example, in negotiations around agricultural goods and textiles. For a
historical analysis of the international regulatory treatment of sugar from a TWAIL
perspective, see MICHAEL FAKHRI, SUGAR AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW (2014).
68
See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7.
69
As Eve Darian-Smith has written, “This shift in terminology [from colonial/
colonized to GN and GS] expands the lens of analysis from state-centered law in
the context of specific national colonial enterprises to a more global postWestphalian worldview that takes into account transnational, regional, and state
interrelations.” Eve Darian-Smith, Postcolonial Law in 18 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 647 (James D. Wright ed.,
1998) (citing Falk).
70
Id.
66
67
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to engage with “the underlying orientalist assumptions in national
and international law that affirm essentialized constructions of
cultural difference.” 71 In Darian-Smith’s words, “what links the
legacy of postcolonial studies to contemporary analyses of legal
orientalism is a central focus on the endurance of historically
structured racial and ethnic divides between Western and nonWestern societies despite a growing appreciation of their respective
interdependencies.” 72 That understanding captures two relevant
ideas in postcolonial theory: the transnational nature of legal
“interdependencies” and the appreciation of ideas of cultural, racial,
and ethnic difference (specifically ideas around superiority); and
how both are constructed and perpetuated. Both of these
dimensions reflect the need for a theory of transnational property
law to engage with postcolonial theory.
Edward Said’s concept of “orientalism”73 remains ever relevant
here in enabling one to see how Global North conceptualizes Global
South, and vice versa, and how each conceptualize themselves in
response to the mirror they see reflected. What, more specifically,
does that imply for property regimes? In part, the dialectical
dynamic of seeing described by Said sustains the myth of coherent,
ahistorical common law property thought by (to put it bluntly)
holding former colonies to a standard of coherence and
enforceability that is not even present in the Global North countries
in whose image the regimes are enacted.74 For example, in economic
development and investment policy literature, one often finds
chastisement of so-called developing countries for not having
strong, enforceable property rights and clear title. While this may
sound fairly neutral, not only does it mask how formality of
property has often been used as a way to disenfranchise the

71
72
73

(1978).

Id. citing Ruskola, 2002.
Id.
EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM: WESTERN REPRESENTATIONS

OF THE

ORIENT

74
See generally Frank Upham, Mythmaking In The Rule Of Law Orthodoxy 7
(CARNEGIE WORKING PAPERS: RULE OF LAW SERIES, DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW
PROJECT, No. 30, 2002) (discussing the perpetuation of the myth that “rule of law”
means legal certainty that exists in places such as the United States when, in
actuality, that ‘certainty’ is not as present as it would seem).
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marginalized,75 it also does not acknowledge the contradictions in
the Global North countries themselves who advocate for those
reforms, such as their own selective enforcement.76
2.1. Conquest, Law, and Sovereignty
This Section introduces several selected examples of conflictual
encounters between European conquerors and indigenous
populations and their land, in the process of which property law
conceptions were both transplanted and imported as well as
reshaped and newly constituted. These brief examples are meant
demonstrate how the consolidation of two now dominant concepts
of property actually took place: (i) the relationship between the idea
of “use” of land and racial hierarchy and (ii) the entwinement of
property and sovereignty. The examples below were chosen
because of their articulations of legal justifications for the claiming
of dominion over land. They are meant to provide an account—
albeit cursory and incomplete—of historical circumstances in order
to illustrate how political claims to land came to be justified and
legalized. This engagement with conquest provides the necessary
background for the analysis of conflictual encounters over the use of
land, further explored in relation to Global South cities in the next
Part.
The evolution of the legal regimes that Europeans used to justify
the conquest and claims over indigenous land unfolded over several
centuries, with different trajectories in different geographies. In the
16th and 17th centuries, it was well established amongst European
states that land could be “taken” if it was unoccupied or
abandoned.77 As for land that was possessed by inhabitants, that
idea of possession as implying rights of ownership would give way
75
See discussion in Part III.C; see also Priya S. Gupta, The Peculiar Circumstances
of Eminent Domain in India, 49 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 445 (2011) (discussing debates over
the status of property rights during the drafting of the Indian Constitution).
76
Laura Underkuffler, Keynote at The Annual Meeting of the Association for
Property, Law, and Society (2015); Upham 2002, supra note 74.
77
See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-71 (5th
ed. 1998); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (discussing the philosophical underpinnings
and justification behind the original creation of legal property).
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to a requirement of “occupation.” There were several interpretations
amongst European nations of what constituted occupation over the
following centuries. Most well-known is that of John Locke, whose
interpretation required labor related to the land in order to claim
legal occupancy. 78 Another concept of occupancy came from
international legal theorist Emmerich de Vattel in the 18th century,
who argued that indigenous peoples could not claim legal
possession (and therefore occupancy) of the land on account of their
apparent lack of permanent residence or use.79 As Patrick Macklem
has noted, the latter conception of occupancy is known as the
“notice” theory in that the kinds of use required for occupancy were
meant to be apparent to European countries.80 As the Americas and
what would become Australia, New Zealand, and surrounding
islands were clearly inhabited by indigenous peoples, the
understanding of “occupied” had to be one that conformed to those
European norms of agricultural use and (visible) residence if it were
to be used to serve the purpose of conquest.81
Various justifications were offered for taking land from
populations deemed to be “uncivilized” through the vessel of
“occupation.” 82 Among those justifications, two in particular
continue to have legacies in later American, Australian, and
Canadian jurisprudence. First was the idea that the legitimacy of a
claim to property was tied to how it was being used by the
claimant—ie., for gathering, agriculture, or something else or
apparently not at all. Understanding the evolution of “use”
therefore necessitates a closer look at what ‘occupation’ entailed,
how it was justified, and how both the content and justification
evolved over time. Second is the idea that the hierarchy of race,

LOCKE, supra note 77.
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS Bk. 1, Chap. 18 at ¶ 209 (1758).
80
MACKLEM, supra note 64, at 80; see also CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND
PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 11-23
(1994) (discussing theories of the origin of legal property).
81
See MACKLEM, supra note 64 (discussing the history of the legal significance
of occupancy, as well as highlighting an argument that Aboriginal prior occupancy
possesses more legal significance than it has been accorded in Canadian law).
82
See generally ANDREW FITZMAURICE, SOVEREIGNTY, PROPERTY AND EMPIRE,
1500–2000 (2014) (discussing the many justifications offered to support the
confiscation of land from indigenous peoples during European colonial expansion).
78
79
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culture, and religion of the claimant was relevant to the designation
of their claim as inferior.83
The idea that occupation gave rise to a claim to property was
central to European expansion during the 16th-19th centuries,84 with
shifting justifications for the exercise of such claims. At first
justifications around the taking of land were primarily tied to
religious and cultural superiority. 85 That perceived cultural
superiority was then used to expand claims from occupation to
forms of rule over populations. The associated reasoning shifted
away from religion as time went on and political theories had to be
reconciled with new forms of commercial life in the 17th and 18th
centuries, as Andrew Fitzmaurice explains. 86 As part of this
reconciliation, occupation began to be linked to the use of property
as opposed to mere inhabitance or holding of the land, above all by
rendering the land fit for agricultural purposes—“English agrarian
capitalism” in Brenna Bhandar’s account.87 The idea of occupation
was transformed to indicate uses of land that which ‘improved’ it—
or ‘developed’ it, as one might say today. 88 By consequence, a
83
See Singer 1991, supra note 58, at 44-55 (discussing a characterization of the
U.S. property regime as a system of “racial caste” in relation to Native Americans);
MACKLEM, supra note 64, ch. 4 (discussing the belief that cultural superiority
justified the Canadian exercise of sovereignty); cf. Brian Slattery, Paper Empires: The
Legal Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North America, in DESPOTIC
DOMINION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BRITISH SETTLER SOCIETIES (John McLaren, A.R. Buck
& Nancy E. Wright eds., 2005) (discussing religious justifications for the seizure of
land from native peoples during the colonization of the Americas). For a
fascinating, comprehensive argument of how the entwinement of property and race
in colonization involved more than just racial domination in territorial claims and
colonial exercises of sovereignty, but rather the relationship was a dialectical one
and was fundamental to political, social, and other forms of racial domination, see
Bhandar 2011, supra note 58, at 66-88.
84
FITZMAURICE, supra note 82, at 2-3.
85
FITZMAURICE, supra note 82, at 8; LOCKE, supra note 77.
86
FITZMAURICE, supra note 82. See also Purdy 2007, supra note 64.
87
BRENNA BHANDAR, COLONIAL LIVES OF PROPERTY: LAW, LAND, AND RACIAL
REGIMES OF OWNERSHIP 35 (2018).
88
LOCKE, supra note 77. Robert Williams has argued that Locke served to
justify common law property thought deeming that Native Americans did not have
full property rights because they had not “developed” it and they did not recognize
the same form of rights of ownership that common law did. Robert A. Williams Jr,
Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism And Colonialism
in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 (1989). Brenna
Bhandar provides a fascinating historical account of Irish political economist
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society that occupied the land by improving upon it was seen to hold
a superior right to property. Underlying this justification was the
belief of cultural and civilizational superiority, which was believed
to manifest itself through how societies used land. 89 Bhandar
eloquently captures that link between improvement of land and
assumed civilizational superiority by arguing that the English
moved toward a scientific method of quantification of valuation of
land and people and “created an ideological juggernaut that defined
people and land as unproductive in relation to agricultural
production and deemed them to be waste and in need of
improvement.” 90 From here, she further argues, “ownership and
subjectivity” were fused together “in a way that had devasting
consequences for entire populations who did not cultivate their
lands for the purposes of commercial trade and marketized
exchange.”91
The combination of cultural superiority and the idea that nonagricultural use was of lesser worth than agricultural use created a
lens through which land seen as unused was therefore considered
empty. To perceive of such land as terra nullius 92 —empty land—
stood in stark contrast to generations of indigenous people living on
it, and yet it served in a circular way in certain geographies to justify
the idea that such land had just been ‘discovered’ and could
therefore be occupied and claimed by Europeans. Once the
occupation of the conquerors was established, so too was
‘dominion’—the right to control land. Dominion also, though, came
to mean a claim to the exercise of sovereignty—not exclusive
sovereignty but a form of sovereignty nonetheless—over people of
that land as well. Over time, exercising control over those people
William Petty’s linking an apparent lack of cultivation of land by the Irish to
justifications for English conquest. BHANDAR 2018, supra note 87, in particular
Chapter 1.
89
FITZMAURICE, supra note at 82, at 3 (noting that the indigenous were seen to
have “moved from ‘hypothetical state of nature to an agricultural state”).
90
BHANDAR 2018, supra note 87, at 35.
91
BHANDAR 2018, supra note 87, at 35.
92
Note that in Fitzmaurice’s account, he is careful to trace how the use of the
term in this way did not emerge until much later, at which time it was applied
retroactively to justify conquest. On at least five different characterizations by
historians on how terra nullius was used, including discussion around Fitzmaurice’s
account, see Lauren Benton & Benjamin Straumann, Acquiring Empire by Law: From
Roman Doctrine to Early Modern European Practice, 28 L. & HIST. REV. 1 (2010).
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entirely—ruling them—added imperium to some exercises of
dominion in settler colonialism.93
Because the concept of “occupation” evolved in a way that
encompassed sovereignty and imperium, this meant that the
(imposed) laws of conquest represented entwined regimes of
property and international legal claims. The justifications that were
offered for the taking of land (the idea of use and racial superiority)
as well as the imposition of imperial rule continue to have a legacy
in how common law property law prioritizes claims to land today
as well as engagements with indigenous sovereignty.94
In Australia, that sovereignty over territory (and eventually over
people) was blurred with Crown ownership of the land itself, as
recounted by the Australian High Court in the 1992 Mabo v
Queensland case concerning indigenous claims to title. 95 Justice
Brennan, writing for three of the six justices in the majority, reviews
the history of the Crown’s claims to sovereignty over the land
inhabited by the indigenous Meriam people through the use of terra
nullius and the subsequent recognition of those claims by Australian
Courts in the following centuries.96 He then turns to the various
justifications for the “acquisition of sovereignty over the territory of
‘backward peoples,’” including the “benefits of Christianity and
European civilization” and the idea that “Europeans had a right to
bring lands into production if they were left uncultivated by the
93
DAVID B. ABERNETHY, THE DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL DOMINANCE: EUROPEAN
OVERSEAS EMPIRES 1415–1980 185-88 (2000); see Patrick McAuslan, In the Beginning
was the Law . . . An Intellectual Odyssey, Draft Paper for The Practice of Law and
Development: Socio-Legal Approaches Conf. held at Cornell Univ. (Apr. 18-20, 2004),
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=e
alccs_pld [https://perma.cc/8H4D-FEDU]; see Purdy 2007, supra note 64; see also
Matthew Craven, Colonialism and Domination, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 862-89 (Bardo Fassbender, Anne Peters, Simone
Peter, & Daniel Högger eds., 2012) (discussing the creation of legal structures
justifying and legitimizing colonial and imperial activity).
94
See, e.g., Ivana Isailović, Indigenous Peoples’ Claims and Challenges over Control
of Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LAW 436-53 (Ugo
Mattei & John D. Haskell eds., 2015).
95 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 at Brennan op., ¶¶ 45-56. The
Court cites Roberts-Wray to explain the blurring of the “distinction between the
Crown’s title to a colony and the Crown’s ownership of land in the colony.” Id. at
¶ 45.
96
Id. at Brennan op., ¶ 33. The discussion included a reference to U.S.
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall’s Worcester v. Georgia. Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. 515, 543-44 (1832).
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indigenous inhabitants.” 97 Based on that understanding of the
“backwardness” of the population and the characterization of their
use of the land as not cultivated,98 the doctrine of terra nullius was
expanded to include land that had been inhabited. This expanded
view of terra nullius based the idea of habitation on the presence of
law—more specifically, on a “hypothesis being that there was no
local law already in existence in the territory” of indigenous
people.99
In the end, in recognition that “the common law should neither
be nor be seen as frozen in an age of racial discrimination,”100 the
Mabo Court re-instated indigenous title on lands where the title had
not already been legally extinguished, which was meant to overturn
the expanded application of the doctrine of terra nullius to lands
inhabited by indigenous people in Australia.101
How does this brief account of the evolution of legal
justifications for the conquest of already-occupied land and
sovereign peoples contribute to an understanding of property as
transnational? The history told by the Australian High Court is a
rich account of how the transnational encounters between the British
and the indigenous people—in effect, a claim over land and people
across jurisdictional borders—resulted in the creation of new
(unjust) law and a sanctioned exercise of sovereignty that would be
applied over centuries not only in what would become Australia but
in other geographies as well. The account also reveals the historical
circulation of ideas regarding indigenous property holdings. With
97 Id. at Brennan op., ¶ 33. The Court also noted that land in this case had in
fact been gardened. Id.
98 Id. The Court stated that the land was uncultivated despite the fact that it
had been gardened. Id. Not only was this circular reasoning—because the
population was seen as ‘backward’, their use couldn’t have been cultivation—but
also, note the double meaning of ‘cultivated’.
99
Id. at ¶ 36 (citations omitted). Per this hypothesis, “the indigenous
inhabitants of a settled colony had no recognized sovereign, else the territory could
have been acquired only by conquest or cession. The indigenous people of a settled
colony were thus taken to be without laws, without a sovereign and primitive in
their social organization.” Id. The Court also noted that this doctrine remained
intact, despite the findings of later courts that there had, in fact, been indigenous
law in existence at the time in question. Id. at ¶¶ 37-38.
100 Id. at ¶ 42.
101 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 at Order. See generally LARISSA
BEHRENDT, ACHIEVING SOCIAL JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE
(2003) (detailing the ongoing conflict despite the Mabo ruling).
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regard to the justifications of the use of terra nullius, and the histories
of encounters with indigenous people, the Court draws on cases
from other jurisdictions through history as well as in then-present
times, including the United States, India, and Jamaica. In the retelling of historical moments when terra nullius came to be and was
expanded, international jurists such as Vattel, Vitoria, and
Blackstone were drawn upon in the various opinions.102
In the United States, while the concept of terra nullius was less
explicitly drawn upon by judges,103 a constellation of ideas around
legitimate use and claims were transformed into a legal regime that
limited the rights and the sovereignty of Native Americans.
Through these cases one sees how the application of a particular
concept of property—the designation of use—to the act of taking
ownership of land resulted not only in justifying the act but in
making it legal. This legal formation can be traced across several
cases written by Chief Justice John Marshall in the early 1800s.104
The first, Johnson v. M’Intosh in 1823, offered Marshall’s own account
of several stages of discovery and conquest and the associated rights
of Native Americans,105 before holding that Native Americans had
rights of possession but not full property rights. Marshall’s ruling
limited their right to alienate their property to only the United States
federal government. Marshall explicitly justifies this abridgment of
the full rights attached to title by reference to the lack of cultivation
of the land as well as the “savage” nature of the Native Americans.106
102 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 at ¶ 33-35 (Brennan opinion);
id. at ¶ 11 (Deane and Gaudron opinion) in particular.
103
Stuart Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in Early
Australia, 23 L. & HIST. REV. 95 (2005).
104 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
105
See Slattery’s Paper Empires for a rich review of Marshall’s linear stages of
discovery and conquest in the context of Spain, France, and Britain’s changing
justifications and doctrines of conquest. Brian Slattery, Paper Empires: The Legal
Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North America, in DESPOTIC DOMINION:
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BRITISH SETTLER SOCIETIES (John McLaren, A.R. Buck & Nancy E.
Wright eds., 2005).
106
Marshall refers to the Native Americans as “fierce savages whose
occupation was war and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.”
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823). See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., THE
AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST
(1992).
Following Jedediah Purdy’s argument, that characterization of
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Jedediah Purdy reads Johnson v. M’Intosh as “not just a property
case” but also as “the leading American case in the law of
imperialism.” 107 Purdy argues that Johnson should be read as an
encounter between the “competing claims of representatives of two
political societies, one dominant, the other subordinate, within an
extended system of such domination” and that “the question of the
case is not which political society will prevail, but what concessions
the dominant society will make to the subordinate one.” 108 His
reading is even more convincing when one considers the legacy of
the case and the hierarchy it imposed through its distinguishing of
rights to property based on indigenous status. That legacy can be
traced through the Dawes Act of 1887 which split up Native
American landholdings into individual tracts to the current laws
and procedures for the determination of tribal status, 109 the
limitation of the sovereignty of tribes through legal regimes
implicating property and political power, and the language used to
justify these distinctions.110
In summary, through the encounters of conquest, the idea that
property would be tied to sovereignty (that the political conquest of
territory could morph to ownership claims over land and the control
of people) becomes crystalized. The idea of the entwinement of
property and sovereignty itself as well as the racialized hierarchy of
legitimate land uses has legacies today in common law property.111
Moreover, conquest itself was strengthened through the associated claims
to property: transfers of land to the conquerors served as justification
for violations of indigenous sovereignty more generally. The legal
“uncivilized” was not just associated with Native American societies but can be
understood in the broader context of a distinguishing between “civilized” and
“uncivilized” nations as per U.S. modes of imperialism. Purdy 2007, supra note 64,
at 331.
107
Purdy 2007, supra note 64, at 331.
108
Purdy 2007, supra note 64, at 331.
109
William Wood, Indians, Tribes, and (Federal) Jurisdiction, 65 U. KAN. L. REV.
415 (2016).
110
WILLIAMS 2005, supra note 64; ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., THE AMERICAN
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1992).
111
This can be observed, for example, in the efforts to zone out racial
minorities from American suburbs. See DAVID M. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY:
STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (2010); Priya S.
Gupta, Governing the Single-Family House: A (Brief) Legal History, 37 U. HAW. L. REV.
187-243 (2015).
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and political architecture supporting claims of conquerors to that
land and to exercise some form of rule over people 112 can be
observed in many encounters around the world, continuing to the
present day,113 for example in relation to Standing Rock in North
Dakota in the United States, 114 Algonquin land in Canada, 115 and
Juru sacred sites in Australia.116
This legalization of the taking of land through the
transformation of the doctrines of ‘occupation’ and ‘use’ has
powerful implications for the coherency of liberal property theory.
First, the idea of a hierarchy of “use” at the top of which are superior
societies who use land for wealth creation continues to endure. This
conceptualization of property continues to justify shifting resources
away from populations, and from there, even territory and self-rule
and sovereignty.117 Second, the theory of what justified a claim to
land (superiority of use) was a product of its historical context and
motivations of certain historical actors. (More recently, agriculture,
as a form of the highest cultivation of land would give way below to
other uses such as industrial manufacturing.) Expressed differently,
what this example illustrates is that property theory is not
ahistorical—it was formed in response to particular circumstances.
The myth of ahistorical property doctrine only furthers its ability to
112
On the paternalism of colonialism, see DIPESH CHAKRABARTY,
PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE
(2000).
113
For example, Patrick McAuslan has traced the use of land law in New
Zealand as ‘a weapon of colonization.’ McAuslan 2015, supra note 39, at 343. Burger
and Frymer use American ideas of empire to trace the legal treatment of Native
American property to the current international IPR regimes on seeds. Michael
Burger & Paul Frymer, Property Law and American Empire, 34 U. HAW. L. REV. 471
(2012). See also Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unraveling the Racial Context of
Property Rights, or How to Stop Engaging in Conquest, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1 (2017).
114
Kyle Whyte, The Dakota Access Pipeline, Environmental Injustice, and U.S.
Colonialism, 19 RED INK: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDIGENOUS LITERATURE,
ARTS, & HUMANITIES 154 (2017).
115
Ian Austen, Vast Indigenous Land Claims in Canada Encompass Parliament
TIMES
(Nov.
12,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/
Hill,
N.Y.
2017/11/12/world/canada/canada-first-nations-algonquin-land-claims.html
[https://perma.cc/N2SG-2XT3].
116
Ben Smee, Adani Coal Port Faces Possible ‘Stop Order’ After Traditional Owners
(July
5,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/
Object,
GUARDIAN
environment/2018/jul/05/adani-coal-port-faces-possible-stop-order-aftertraditional-owners-object [https://perma.cc/89T3-XRNX].
117
See MACKLEM, supra note 64.
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make opaque political decisions around the allocation of land and
resources.
Third, these moves worked to entrench a British colonial version
of common law property, and attempted to foreclose the plurality of
indigenous conceptions of land claims as well as their ways of
relating to land. 118 Recognizing a more pluralistic conception of
property would have significant implications for land distribution
today. For example, accepting a plurality of conceptions around
claiming title would force Canadian law to reconcile itself with
indigenous methods of claiming territory.119 Furthermore, plurality
also implies something broader—that entire conceptions of the
relationship between people and land need re-telling. As Macklem
notes, “[d]efining occupation by European standards of cultivation
and notice exclude[d] from the outset legal consideration of the fact
that many Aboriginal people related and continue to relate to land
118
See, e.g., Brian Slattery, The Legal Basis of Aboriginal Title, in ABORIGINAL
TITLE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: DELGAMUUKW V. THE QUEEN (Frank Cassidy ed., 1992);
KIRSTEN ANKER, DECLARATIONS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: A LEGAL PLURALIST APPROACH
TO INDIGENOUS RIGHTS (2014) (offering a pluralist conception of law that is dialogical
and transformative rather than merely inclusive). See generally Jose Mencio
Molintas, The Philippine Indigenous Peoples’ Struggle For Land And Life: Challenging
Legal Texts, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 269 (2004) (discussing conflicts over land in
the context of the rights of indigenous peoples in the Philippines); Rebecca Tsosie,
Land, Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Property in
America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1291 (2000) (discussing Native American understandings
and claims to property rights); Richard Overstall, Encountering the Spirit in the Land:
‘Property’ in a Kinship-Based Legal Order, in DESPOTIC DOMINION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
BRITISH SETTLER SOCIETIES 22-49 (John McLaren, AR Buck & Nancy E Wright eds.,
2005) (discussing Western legal systems’ difficulties in comprehending indigenous
Peoples’ understandings of property). See Paul Nadasdy, “Property” and Aboriginal
Land Claims in the Canadian Subarctic: Some Theoretical Considerations, 104 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 247 (2002) (discussing how “a particular, possibly erroneous,
construction of indigenous law became geographically extended and imposed as
legal authority for a universalized notion of “customary tenure”). See also Heinz
Klug, Defining The Property Rights Of Others: Political Power, Indigenous Tenure and
The Construction Of Customary Land Law, 35 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 119 (1995)
(discussing the same topic with reference to South Africa).
119
See MACKLEM, supra note 64, at 76 explaining how
“the law of Aboriginal title recognizes that, if they can demonstrate that their
ancestors exclusively occupied territory at the time Britain asserted sovereignty
and that they continued to occupy the territory in question, Aboriginal people
enjoy the right of exclusive use and occupation of such territory for a variety of
purposes.”
See also Bhandar 2011, supra note 58, at 64-74 (examining the development of
Canadian legal criteria necessary to establish aboriginal title).
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in ways that defy traditional European understandings of
productive use and notice.” 120 The discussion around the
transformation of cities in the Global South in Part III picks up on
this idea of using land use as a tool to promulgate narrowly
conceived ideas of modernity at the expense of more pluralistic
relationships to land and urban space.
Fourth, as Jedediah Purdy has argued with reference to Johnson,
this legal treatment of indigenous claims to land effectively
“produce[d] two bodies of international law: one governing
relations among full sovereigns, the other governing relations
between full sovereigns and imperfect sovereigns.”121 The logic of
the latter—the laws that govern encounters between full and
imperfect sovereigns—was applied in Johnson as well as in other
cases determining the common law status of indigenous claims to
land. The treatment of claims to property was foundational to the
idea that indigenous sovereignty was somehow a lesser form—an
idea that continues to structure relations between common law
regimes and indigenous regimes even today.122
Finally, as explored above, the hierarchy of ‘use’ mutually
constituted and reinforced ideas around superiority of culture and
race, which were then deployed to justify exercises of control over
land and people. That justification of a racialized hierarchy
extended far beyond property in land123 and underpinned exercises
of sovereignty. It was also foundational to the idea that people of
certain races could themselves be considered the property of
others—the foundational concept underpinning the transatlantic
system of slavery.124

MACKLEM, supra note 64, at 81.
Purdy 2007, supra note 64, at 341.
122
See Singer 1991, supra note 58, at 4 (commenting on the “double standard”
applied to Native Americans and non-Native Americans).
123
See Bhandar 2011, supra note 58, at 69.
124
See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993)
(stating the idea that people could be considered property, foundational to systems
of slavery around the world, deserves its own transnational treatment and is
unfortunately outside the scope of this Chapter’s focus on land-related concepts of
property).
120
121
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2.2. From Colonial to Constitutional and Developmental Property
Regimes
Colonialism in its various forms was also ingrained through
occupation and the exercise of dominion. Colonial rule over time,
place, ruler, ruled, can hardly be generalized, nor can the different
approaches to property that were entrenched through their
processes. One cannot overstate the impact of the imposition of
other systems of property holding, rights, and use over so much of
the world. Moreover, the exchange of ideas regarding rights and
regimes over land, and the formation of ideas through those colonial
encounters, provide yet another dimension through which the
perceived past is actually an ongoing moment for property theory.
This Section will trace one thread of analysis in particular: the legacy
of colonial-era land regimes as revealed in the political choices and
tensions during the writing of new constitutions.125 It will explore
this phenomenon in India and South Africa before turning in the
next Section to the legacy of colonial-era legal regimes more
generally and the extent of that legacy’s impact on economic
development and investment law and policy still today.
As postcolonial political scientist and anthropologist Partha
Chatterjee has noted, the key concern in legal-constitutional
framework of postcolonial politics is “the question of social
(including economic) transformation:
Whatever the form of the transition from colonial rule—
whether a peaceful handover of power or an armed
liberation war—the new postcolonial regime almost
everywhere was confronted with the pressing necessity of
transforming, whether gradually or radically, the inherited
institutions of colonial society . . . the extent to which a set

125
See Upendra Baxi, Postcolonial Legality: A Postscript from India, 45
VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN ÜBERSEE/LAW AND POLITICS IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN
AMERICA 178, 187 (2012) (stating “[a] central problem [of Third World
Constitutionalism] has been one of redefinition of property relations. Given the
diversity of patterns of colonization and national resistance movements,
postcolonial legality furnishes divergent narratives.”).
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of precommitted foundational laws should bind the
transformative acts of the new regime.126
The decision to continue or to undo colonial-era property
distribution is key to that transition. In the Global South during the
twentieth century, these tensions often came to the surface during
the deliberation of new constitutions.127 The deep significance of
who was able to hold land through colonial rule and for what ends
can be evidenced by the significant debates that took place around
assigning land rights that perpetuated the status quo or that
reformed land regimes to be more equitable. At the heart of this
tension was an underlying motivation that in order to present a
newly formed government to the world as a stable protector of a
liberal rights regime, certain and secure rights to property were
perceived as a must.
Two brief examples follow—India in the late 1940s and South
Africa in the 1990s. What is important are the questions raised in
the respective assemblies and each example’s connection to the
other. These debates and transformations did not happen in an
ahistorical or acontextual vacuum, and each nation’s connection to
dominant ways of conceptualizing property was made evident in
the manner this topic was debated, adapted, and emergent.
In India, for example, for several years after gaining
independence of 1947, a significant debate regarding property rights
clauses took place during the writing of the Indian Constitution in
the Constituent Assembly. 128 Assembly members struggled with
whether to preserve the status quo of property holdings—and the
accompanying social order—or to attempt a massive societal
transformation. The debate raised many foundational questions for
the new government. It had to decide whether the new legal regime
126
Partha Chatterjee, Introduction: Postcolonial Legalism, 34 COMP. STUDIES
SOUTH ASIA, AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST, 224, 224-25 (2014).
127
See generally Jennifer Nedelsky, Should Property Be Constitutionalized? A
Relational And Comparative Approach, in PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE
21ST CENTURY 417 (G. E. Van Maanen & A. J. van der Walt eds., 1996) (discussing
the relationship of customary land use systems and European legal property
frameworks in developing countries); ALEXANDER 2006, supra note 9.
128
See
CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY
DEBATES
OF
INDIA,
http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/[https://perma.cc/L6KL-TXK7]. See generally Gupta
2011, supra note 75; GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: A
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE (2003).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/2

2020]

Globalizing Property

649

would signal its commitment to strong property rights in the
classical liberal sense (by deeming the right to property a
fundamental constitutional right, and thereby preserving current
landholdings) or whether it would decisively try to rectify the
unequal distribution of land entrenched during colonial times by
supporting various state programs to redistribute land holdings.
The former—strong property rights—would continue the colonialera regime of land acquisition found in the Land Acquisition Act of
The latter—land
1894 that the British had imposed. 129
redistribution—would forge a bold new path for the newly
independent nation but it would also be a move away from the
dominant common law property regimes (found in England and
America). This choice echoed larger tensions faced by the newly
independent former colonies between, in Upendra Baxi’s words,
“the liberal bourgeois” and “revolutionary socialist” forms of
constitutionalism.130 These two discourses manifest themselves in
property clauses as: “[T]he socialist postcolonial form (SPF) and the
capitalist postcolonial form (CPF). If SPF celebrates the denial of
ownership in the means of production (private property), CPF
venerates rights in private property.” 131 That difference in the
conception of private property has crucial implications for the class
structure and contours of citizenship:
Whereas in CPF political representation in liberal
constitutionalism is a function of class domination, in the
SPF “state” such representation stands collectivized though
the Party always claiming to represent “workers,”
“peasants,” and “masses”. [sic] If SPF imagines adjudication
as a way of markedly pedagogic role in the construction of
the new socialist human person; CPF insists on a relatively
autonomous liberal self of its citizens (rational choice actors)
pursuing their own ends of private interests (freedoms to
define their life projects).132

129
The origins of the Act can be traced back to at least 1824. See Gupta 2011,
supra note 75.
130
Baxi, supra note 125, at 182.
131
Baxi, supra note 125, at 182.
132
Baxi, supra note 125, at 182.
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Accompanying India’s choice regarding its vision of citizenship
was also a significant question of federalism: how much power
would be delegated to or left with states to decide the property
question? And, underlying that question was a further query about
the nature of Indian federalist government: did Indian states have
residual or delegated power to decide such fundamental questions?
Throughout the Constituent Assembly debates in India,
numerous other constitutions were examined and drawn from—for
example, constitutions from Ireland, Yugoslavia, the United States,
and the U.S.S.R.133 Members of the Assembly drew from a variety
of governmental forms to debate how power should be distributed
horizontally between branches of government and vertically
between the state and federal levels. During these debates,
Assembly Members referenced slavery in America, Marxist theory,
Proudhon and many other examples of property thought that they
felt India should heed (or, in the case of slavery, avoid) at that
time.134 Further, some members were very concerned that including
a strong property rights regime would become a “Magna Carta for
the capitalists”135 and that already-existing property holders would
continue to disproportionately hold valuable resources. It was
believed that this entrenchment would make the Assembly’s goal of
moving towards a “classless society”136 even more difficult.
While the drafters eventually included a fundamental right to
property that recognized that private property could be acquired by
the government through law for a public purpose and with
compensation (similar to other common law constitutions), the issue
was far from settled. The ensuing battle between land reform and
entrenched status quo property rights moved back and forth
between the Supreme Court and Parliament through a series of cases
and legislative acts. 137 At the heart of this debate was the
133
See generally CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES OF INDIA, Book No. 11 Doc.
160 ¶ 32 (Nov. 19, 1949) (speech by Damodar Swarup Seth),
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25415/ [https://perma.cc/G55N-HX4V].
134 See generally id.
135
Id.
136
This is a reoccurring theme in Constituent Assembly Debates. See
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES OF INDIA, Book No. 9 Doc. 137 ¶¶ 55-60 (Sept. 10,
1949) (speech by Damodar Swarup Seth), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/797053/
[https://perma.cc/7W22-KHNY].
137 See Gupta 2011, supra note 75.
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distribution of power between the judicial and legislative branches,
as well as between the federal and state governments. Through
these cases, the boundaries of judicial review, legislative power to
amend the Constitution, and the ongoing question of states’
prerogative to enact land reforms were fought over, shifted, and
eventually settled upon.
In 1978, the Indian Parliament took the right to property out of
the “Fundamental Rights” section of the Constitution and
redrafted it as a weaker provision which would allow for statelevel land reform.138 While that amendment did allow some land
reform acts to be implemented, since India’s transformation
toward economic liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
the absence of a protected fundamental right to property has
enabled the government to appropriate small land holdings in the
name of ‘economic development’ and to redistribute them towards
private industry and mass agriculture,139 A debate over the these
effects continues still today:
The postcolonial quest for equity in property relations
continues, though beset by the inheritance of colonial
inequities aggravated by malgovernance practices . . . The
spread of foreign direct investment and multinational capital
(while posing a different order of challenges to social
activism and human rights movements) also presents a
relatively bleak future for agrarian reforms. The voracious
appetite of multinationals devours prime agricultural lands,
forests, and environment (that provide the necessary
infrastructure for their profit and power). Postcolonial
constitutional texts could not have anticipated the context of
globalization; the task of interpretation has to contend with
the fact that constitutions become merely the “local”
particular that has to adjust somehow to the “universal” in
the global.140
As Baxi’s account reveals, the mal-distributive effects of the
common law property regime that was put in place continues, not
See Gupta 2011, supra note 75.
But see The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, No. 30 of 2013, India Code (2013).
140
Baxi, supra note 125, at 189.
138
139
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only through domestic means, but also through global,
transnational flows of resources, actors, and property thought.
In South Africa in the mid-1990s, the writing of the new postApartheid Constitution also raised significant questions around the
issue of entrenched property versus redistribution.141 While these
questions in some ways mirrored those faced by India—for
example, the existence of legal regimes that enshrined a vastly
inequitable distribution of landholdings—in other ways, these
questions were different, particularly because South Africa needed
to grapple with racial inequality more explicitly enshrined in their
original law. That history of racial discrimination was over a
century old by the time apartheid ended and was well-entrenched
in the law and in unequal property distribution.142 When the time
came for writing a new constitution, a strongly protective property
rights regime would have maintained the status quo of racial
inequality not only in land but economically and socially as well. As
South African property law scholar André van der Walt explains,
[g]iven the central role that apartheid land-use and housing
policies played in the institutionalisation of race-based
inequality, property law specialists and policy makers
recognised that the large-scale political and social changes
that inevitably had to accompany democratisation would
have to include significant reforms of land use policy and of
property law in general.143
The issue of redistributing property to those who had previously
been excluded from securing title was crucial to the promise of truly
dismantling apartheid. At the same time, the establishment of
secure property rights in a new constitution was seen as a key aspect
in the reform of the political and societal stability. The echoes of the
141
See A.J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS (2009); ALEXANDER 2006,
supra note 9; HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 55 (2010) [hereinafter KLUG 2010]; Matthew Chaskalson, The Property
Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution, 10 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 131 (1994); Matthew
Chaskalson, Stumbling Towards Section 28: Negotiations Over The Protection Of
Property Rights In The Interim Constitution, 11 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 222 (1995).
142
See generally JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL
ORDER (1978) (discussing the history of racial discrimination in South African law);
MARTIN CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE 1902-1936: FEAR,
FAVOUR AND PREJUDICE (2001).
143
See A.J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTION 1 (2012).
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post-colonial constitutional process in India in the 1940s in the South
African experience post-apartheid in the 1990s are noteworthy.
According to van der Walt, the Indian struggle between the courts
and parliament was a cautionary tale for South Africa. It
highlighted ongoing societal tension between those with access to
land and those without; drafters in South Africa sought to avoid the
kind of entanglement India had experienced. 144 After significant
debate,145 the South African Constitution was drafted to include a
strong right to property qualified by a sizeable provision detailing
what kinds of ‘use’ were acceptable as “public use.”146 Moreover,
this provision did not stand on its own. Other provisions regarding
social, cultural and economic rights, including housing, were
included and provided more concrete structural support to the ideal
of moving from apartheid to democracy.147
The issues of reform versus entrenchment, change versus status
quo, and concentration versus equity arose in many postcolonial
and post-conflict societies, each with its own history of who had
been able to hold property, and each with its own conception of
what kind of society and division of resources it might have as an
independent state. In many of these places, multiple property
regimes were at work simultaneously—indigenous law, colonial
law and its legacies, comparative law, and foreign claims to land and
resources—each with their own property languages, concepts, and
values. How property regimes would be designed in the aftermath
of these postcolonial or post-conflict moments required a fierce
examination of the fundamental notions of statehood and
sovereignty. Simultaneously, that design would also send signals to
other countries and societies as to the nature of law in the newly

Id. at 4.
KLUG 2010, supra note 141, at 55.
146
Id. at 55-58 (discussing in Article 25 how there were some who advocated
for land redistribution to be enshrined in the Constitution in a way that would have
left out a requirement for “public use” entirely).
147
KLUG 2010, supra note 141, at 132-46 (discussing in Article 26, on the right
to housing, of the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution, that land
distribution continues to be inequitable, a circumstance that a property clause more
explicitly crafted to deal with racial inequality might have alleviated); Heinz Klug,
Hybrid(ity) Rules: Creating Local Law in a Globalized World, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS:
THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY
(Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002).
144
145
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independent state—signals regarding political and economic
legitimacy.148
As the primary institution through which the Global North
encountered the Global South transitioned from colonialism to
economic development,149 international agencies and transnational
economic actors began to exercise increasing influence on property
regime design. In particular, the International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”) and the World Bank attached conditions to their loans and
projects (conditionality) that mandated the establishment of certain
forms of property regimes. 150 This continued into the 1980s and
1990s and into the new millennium as the emphasis on development
evolved into a focus on the rule of law and various forms of investor
protection. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the international financial
institutions (“IFIs”) promulgated the empowerment of private
capital—and foreign capital in particular—as the way forward for
The
development through the Washington Consensus. 151
Washington Consensus was a set of free trade and capital flow
oriented policy programs that came to be powerfully orthodox and
implemented in many places. They included a number of legal
reforms that were meant to make investors feel secure—including
ensuring their property rights, contract enforcement, and other
supportive legal architecture. 152 That a key dimension of the
Washington Consensus was that this protection of property rights
would have profound effects on IMF and World Bank conditionality

148
This was true, even late in the 20th century, in central and eastern Europe
as those countries negotiated to become part of the European Union (EU). There as
well, the lure of entrenching a liberal, individualized property rights regime
remained strong.
149
See GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS TO
GLOBAL FAITH (Patrick Camiller trans., 2014); SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONIZING
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF
UNIVERSALITY (2011).
150
See World Bank, Land Reform (May 1975).
151
See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN
AMERICAN READJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED (John Williamson ed., 1989);
World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (May
1997).
152
Williamson, supra note 151; See Priya S. Gupta, From Statesmen to
Technocrats to Financiers: Development Agents in the Third World, in BANDUNG, GLOBAL
HISTORY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL PASTS AND PENDING FUTURES (Luis
Eslava, Michael Fakhri, & Vasuki Nesiah eds., 2017).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/2

2020]

Globalizing Property

655

for the decades to come, as resources continue to be allocated in this
direction.153
2.3. The Protection of Foreign Investment through Property Regimes
The protection of property rights for foreign investors has a long
history, of which IFI policy is a relatively recent chapter.154 At least
since the 17th and 18th century activities of the Dutch East India
Company, have states pushed for property rights recognition
outside of their borders. 155 That tension between the interests of
“capital-exporting states in developing external norms to protect
foreign investment through international law” and those of “capitalimporting states in assert[ing] total domestic control of incoming
foreign investment” 156 played out initially in state-to-state
negotiation and treaties. Through the centuries, the more powerful
interests of capital-exporters left their mark through the formation
of customary international law and norms with a strong inclination
towards investor protection, which continues to manifest itself in
recent times and in new fora.
The growth of investment regimes, in particular with regard to
the protection of foreign investors’ rights to property, represents
another powerful genealogy of property law evolution with a
profoundly transnational reach. The investment narrative of
153
See Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons, in WORLD
BANK PUBLICATIONS, 3, 19, 63 (Stefan Koeberle et al. eds., 2005),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/409401114615847489/Conditionalityrevisedpublication.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVS5HWNN] (reviewing that conditionality in 2005, and recognizing that in the 1990s,
a new era of conditionality had been ushered in by donors, who “sought to improve
the protection of private property rights and create a conducive environment for
private sector development.” As a result, the share of policy-based lending shifted
significantly towards public-sector reforms, which included the protection of
property rights. They note that this was particularly true for “poor-performing
countries”). See also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).
154
See CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE
NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1985); KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF
CAPITAL (2013); NOEL MAURER, THE EMPIRE TRAP: THE RISE AND FALL OF U.S.
INTERVENTION TO PROTECT AMERICAN PROPERTY OVERSEAS, 1893–2013 (2013).
155
MILES, supra note 154.
156
See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 31.
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property brings into sharper relief the conflictual sites at which
property is at the center of capital flows, licensing, and disputes over
title and prior use of land, as well as disputes over long-held
practices in relation to land.157 At the heart of such struggles we are
repeatedly confronted with starkly asymmetric dynamics between
local stakeholders’ and multi-national corporations’ claims to
property. As such conflicts erupt and unfold around a widely
diverse range of vested interests including resource extraction, land
use, and indigenous practices, the roots of these conflicts are
inextricably linked to the deep history and geography of property’s
transnational formation.
As M. Sornarajah’s seminal account of foreign investment law
examines, an international legal regime around investment was first
formed between the United States and Latin America through the
United States’ efforts to protect the investments of its nationals.158
Over time, and with decolonization in Africa and Asia, investor
This
protection
became
more
internationalized. 159
internationalization brought to the fore issues around the
universalization of the Calvo Doctrine (Argentine jurist Carlos
Calvo’s idea that foreigners should not enjoy more rights than
citizens in Latin American countries, and should, therefore, be
subject to local jurisdiction for disputes involving their investments
in those countries 160 and permanent control over natural
resources161).162 Later phases of international investment law were

157
See MACKLEM, supra note 64 (Chapter 2 in particular describes the ongoing
destruction of Aboriginal culture in Canada); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF
CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2003)
(noting the dominant account of property title, international capital, and
development).
158
See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 32-35.
159
See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 31-42.
160
See Patrick Juillard, Calvo Doctrine/Calvo Caluse, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007), https://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e689?prd=EPIL
[https://perma.cc/NPQ6-NE9M].
161 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 31-42; Pahuja, supra note 6; Georges AbiSaab, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Economic Activities, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 597 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed.,
1991).
162
Id. at 35 (noting through the NIEO and the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States).
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marked by the Washington Consensus and a neoliberal ascendancy
of the norm of investor protection.163
During and after the 1990s, the idea of investor protection has
become of the utmost importance—not just in the conditionalities of
the IFIs referred to above, but also in regional and bilateral trade and
investment treaties.164 This shift is manifested in: a change of actors
involved in these disputes from state-state to investor-state; a
change of the forum of dispute settlement from those of international
legal institutions to those of arbitration; 165 and a change of the
substantive law applied in that forum. It is important to highlight
that the change in law increasingly prioritized foreign investors at
the expense of other interests, including in regimes governing the
expropriation of the property of foreign investors. 166 While
customary international law had permitted states to expropriate
property for a ‘public purpose’ with full compensation, as long as
there existed due process and an “absence of discrimination
between foreign investors and different home states,” 167 these
regimes have given way to providing hospitable environments for
foreign investment and allowed for the development of a powerful
policy orthodoxy. 168 With the rise of this orthodoxy, trade and
163
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 43-68 (detailing a discussion on resistance—
on the reality of whether international investment agreements do in fact attract
foreign direct investment, and if such agreements are worth the trade-off of state
sovereignty); FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (Olivier De Schutter et al.
eds., 2013).
164
See Gus Van Harten, Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The
Contours of the International System of Investor Protection, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON.
600, 608-09 (2005) [hereinafter Van Harten 2005] (noting the reasons for the
proliferation); JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING
INTERNATIONALIINVESTMENT (2011) (examining the increasingly fragmented treaty
regimes governing international investment).
165
As Adkins and Grewal point out, however, investment arbitration for the
protection of foreign investors has a long history, used at least since the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries to protect colonial investments, before its manifestation as
a “tool of economic development” to provide foreign capital with the “special
protection” that was believed necessary “in order [for it] to flow into areas subject
to ongoing economic and political uncertainty.” Cory Adkins & David Singh
Grewal, Democracy and Legitimacy in Investor-State Arbitration, 126 YALE L.J. F. 65, 66
(2016).
166
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 191-245.
167
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 191.
168
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 191-245.
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investment agreements have become more specific regarding
investor protection, including for example, with the inclusion of
provisions specifying arbitration as the chosen forum for disputes
and the empowering of investors to bring direct actions in those
arbitral fora.
The increasing reliance on the new type of forum has
transformed how the law is applied. Arbitrators, who had “been
schooled in international commercial arbitration where property
and contract were sacrosanct,” emphasize the priority of investor
protection over other considerations.169 In effect, as Gus Van Harten
argues, “states have turned private arbitration into a method of
governance based on generalized investor-state arbitration,” in that
this system of investor protection relies on the state to “establish
institutions that in turn regulate the use of public authority at the
domestic level.” 170 But, “the system of investor protection [also]
relies on the coercive authority of states, within their territory, to
seize the assets of other states and make those assets available to
investors.” 171 Van Harten summarizes the issue of delegation of
governance prerogative of states:
[t]he system of investor protection . . . reflects an evolution
of that model in the context of an international political
economy in which the interests of multinational enterprises
are prioritized in regulatory decision-making . . . . The system
of investor protection is a model of transnational governance that
relies on state authority in order to authorize and enforce investor
claims while affording broad decision-making power to private
individuals and organisations. The exercise of state power is made
169
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 199. The 2000 ICSID award in Santa Elena v.
Costa Rica is a notable example. See Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A.
v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award (2000). For a
critical review of the prioritization of investor compensation over environmental
interests, see MILES, supra note 154, at 166-67, and Philippe Sands, Searching for
Balance: Concluding Remarks, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 198 (2002). For an insightful
discussion of how the NAFTA Article 1105 principle of “minimum standard of
treatment” was used in a NAFTA arbitral forum to justify circumventing Canada’s
effort to protect the environment and interests of indigenous peoples in Nova Scotia
in Clayton v. Canada, see Adkins & Grewal, supra note 165. See generally KYLA
TIENHAARA, THE EXPROPRIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING
FOREIGN INVESTORS AT THE EXPENSE OF PUBLIC POLICY (2009).
170
Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 602, 610.
171
Id. at 610 (drawing from (Stone Sweet, 2002)).
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subject to private discretion exercised both by private investors and
private arbitrators.172
The systemic nature of the just-described investor protection
regime can be seen in the broader context of global capital flows and
financial regulation. Investment protection is but one key element
in an overarching shift of national and international rulemaking that
prioritizes the removal of regulatory obstacles to the advantage of
an increasingly mobile and volatile flow of investments in and out
of national and regional markets.
Investor protection through arbitration has also another
dimension symptomatic of the shift in governance. It is now
standard for trade and investment treaties to include the mechanism
of Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) through which
corporations and investors can seek redress from countries directly
for infringements on their property rights. Van Harten has referred
to this proliferation of “investor state arbitration as the backbone of
an emergent international system of investor protection.” 173 The
system has moved from one where states represented investor
interests in negotiation and dispute resolution, to one of direct
representation, but only for certain non-state actors. Refugees,
migrants and those who would claim human rights violations do
not have this kind of standing.174 The recent cases brought by the
tobacco giant Philip Morris regarding intellectual property rights
illustrate the controversy around the use of these mechanisms.
In 2010, Philip Morris International (“PMI”) filed an action
seeking $25M in damages as well as injunctive relief against
Uruguay in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) alleging that the country’s introduction of new
health regulations stipulating that tobacco packaging include
pictures and warnings about the dangers of smoking. 175 PMI
claimed that these regulations, as well as others, restricted sales of
more than one brand of their cigarettes and were treaty violations in
that they would impair their investment and amounted to an
Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 610-11 (emphasis added).
See Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 602. See also VAN HARTEN 2008,
supra note 7.
174
Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 602-03.
175 Philip Morris v. Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration
(2010).
172
173
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expropriation.176 PMI filed similar actions in Australia and Norway,
and threatened them in Togo, Namibia and the Solomon Islands.177
PMI was claiming, in effect, was a new kind of “regulatory
taking” on an international scale that would limit a country’s
prerogative to issue regulations that might interfere with PMI’s
potential future profits. After a much-publicized arbitral battle, the
tribunal for the Uruguay decision in 2016 found in favor of Uruguay.
The arbitrators found no expropriation, and PMI was ordered to pay
a portion of Uruguay’s attorney fees.178
These and other ISDS actions reveal the vulnerabilities of both
wealthy and less wealthy countries under the current model of ISDS.
By enacting a measure apparently in the health interests of their
people respective populations, these states unwittingly exposed
themselves to a drawn-out arbitral battle and millions of dollars in
legal fees. In PMI’s case, PMI lost against Australia, as well as
Uruguay and Norway, but all claims exposed these countries to
expensive legal battles. Moreover, other actions, for example

176
Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos
S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 Award (July 8,
2016) at ¶ 9-12.
177 See Philip Morris Asia Ltd v. The Commonwealth of Austl., UNCITRAL,
PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction (2015); Philip Morris Norway AS v.
the Norwegian State, represented by the Ministry of Health and Care Serv., EFTA
Court, Case E-16/10, Judgment (Sept. 2011); Juliet Samuel, The Defeat of Big Tobacco
on Plain Packaging is Good for Democracy, TELEGRAPH (May 19, 2016),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/19/the-defeat-of-big-tobacco-onplain-packaging-is-good-for-democra/ [https://perma.cc/LB5J-BKHL]. British
American Tobacco and other tobacco companies have also brought or threatened
this kind of legal action against Kenya, Uganda, Namibia, Togo, Gabon, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. See Sarah Boseley, Threats, Bullying,
Lawsuits: Tobacco Industry’s Dirty War For The African Market, GUARDIAN (July 17,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/12/big-tobacco-dirtywar-africa-market [https://perma.cc/R2DC-H5SG].
178
Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos
S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 Award (July 8,
2016) at ¶ 590.
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Vattenfall v. Germany, Ethyl v. Canada, and Clayton v. Canada,179 reveal
the exposure of wealthy nations to these kinds of battles as well.180
These actions reiterate perennial questions regarding
sovereignty, regulation, and international law, which are now
making their reappearance under the heading of “property.” By
effectively subjecting national regulation to direct scrutiny and, to
some extent, even control by investors and corporations, investment
arbitration has exposed stark disparities between countries’ ability
to exercise sovereign control over welfare policies and other
redistributive regulations.
While many countries have
commitments under the WTO and other institutions and
agreements to avoid certain kinds of regulation, this action exposed
the power differentials between a multi-national corporation and a
relatively small country. This is further illustrated when one
compares Uruguay’s GDP of $56B with PMI’s $80B revenue/year.181
In other words, one might think of Uruguay and other similarlysituated countries as operating their domestic regulatory regimes
under the shadow of ISDS.182

179
See Adkins & Grewal, supra note 165, for a discussion of Clayton v. Canada,
a NAFTA arbitral suit against Canada for their determination a quarry in Nova
Scotia could not go forward in light of the harm to the environmental and
indigenous rights.
180
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 196-99, citing Ethyl v. Canada, 38 ILM 708
(1999) and Vattenfall v. Germany, ICSID, Case No. ARB/09/6, Award (Mar. 11,
2011). In the Canadian case, it was a “statement of a minister announcing a future
intention regarding a measure to controlling the production of a potentially
carcinogenic substance” that was seized upon by the foreign investor. See
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 196. See also Adkins & Grewal, supra note 165, at 66
(discussing specific instances and the context of how “developed democracies are
now being targeted under a system of arbitration they had designed for use
elsewhere”).
181
Leo Sun, Why Is Philip Morris International Inc. Suing These Countries?,
MOTLEY
FOOL
(Nov.
23,
2015),
https://www.fool.com/investing/
general/2015/11/23/why-is-philip-morris-international-inc-suing-these.aspx
[https://perma.cc/DKM2-MGBE].
182
See Cecilia Olivet & Alberto Villareal, Who Really Won the Legal Battle
Between Philip Morris and Uruguay?, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jul/28/who-reallywon-legal-battle-philip-morris-uruguay-cigarette-adverts
[https://perma.cc/2H7L-S92N] (“The arbitration panel’s decision to hear the
[Uruguay] case put a brake on the adoption of similar tobacco control measures in
Costa Rica, Paraguay and New Zealand, among others.”). See, e.g., TIENHAARA,
supra note 169.
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The actions also highlight the de facto asymmetry between states
and multi-national corporations.
They expose the potential
windfalls to corporations from trade and investment treaties that
include such ISDS measures. These treaties are agreed to by states,
and while not always negotiated by companies, seem to operate to
their benefit. Under current public international law, corporations
lack personality, enabling them to avoid “accountability for wrongs
[they] may commit during [their] operations.” 183 In short, as
Sornarajah has framed it, the multinational corporation has “rights
but no responsibilities” and “wields considerable power to effect
change in both domestic and international law,” in part through
their use of “low-order sources of international law in constructing
rules favourable” to them. 184
Finally, in seeking injunctive relief, the PMI actions also
implicate state sovereignty in that such relief would give private
actors “unprecedented authority over states’ traditional lawmaking
powers by allowing them [private actors] to move to invalidate
laws” passed in the public interest to accord with the state’s own
interest.185 And yet, these private actors remain largely invisible as
subjects of international law, in part because, as Cutler has argued,
they have actively pushed for legal structures that “disembed
commercial law and practice from the ’public‘ sphere and re-embed
it in the ’private‘ sphere, free from democratic and social control.”186
Stepping back from PMI, one can discern two insights. First,
focusing specifically on the transnational, border-crossing
dimension of property, intellectual property appears to be the
primary field to contain both the principles to frame and justify, and
the doctrinal-regulatory instruments to facilitate, the global
diffusion of related norms. Examining the varied histories of
international and transnational intellectual property regimes 187
leads to further inquiries into the evolving political economies to
which the regulatory regimes stand in relation, and with which they
183
184
185

165.

SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 21.
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 21. See also Johns 1994, supra note 51.
See VAN HARTEN 2008, supra note 7; see also Adkins & Grewal, supra note

CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 13.
See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); ROBERT P. MERGES & SEAGULL HAIYAN SONG,
TRANSNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: TEXT AND CASES (2018).
186
187
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stand in mutually constitutive relationships. With this examination
of the political complexities, the neat and linear story of a liberal
extension of the individualistic 188 right to property into the
immaterial realm is exposed as both overly-simplistic and to some
degree inaccurate.189
Second, one can see how over time, the nature of the protection
of investors’ property has shifted in at least three ways. First, the
idea of what is protected—what constitutes an “investment”—has
shifted towards intangible property involving “rights of control
through shareholdings rather than ownership”190 and “goodwill or
intellectual property or holding companies and short-term capital
flows.” 191 Second, what that investment is protected from has
expanded as well, and now includes the potential for protection
against environmental, health, price, export-related, or industrial
regulations that might decrease the future profits of corporations. It
also includes protection against “administrative control
mechanisms” such as licensing provisions.192 Finally, the remedies
offered have expanded as well. As “compulsory arbitration lead[s]
to a damages award rather than more conventional public law
remedies,”193 this shift now allows petitioners in this case to seek
both injunctive relief and pecuniary damages.
It is also worth noting the entrance of new laws shaped by
encounters across jurisdictional borders. Here what is property and
the nature of protective regimes around it have been transformed
not only because of the transnational encounters between investors
and states, but also between those actors and localities through the
188

(1962).

See C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM

189
For an intriguing history of narratives of imperialism, colonization and
exploitation in the assertion of intellectual property rights, see SHIVA, supra note 32;
see also Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Notso-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J.
GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 2 (1998).
190
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 199-200 (explaining the difficulty in
evaluating the nature of protection for shareholders).
191
Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 604.
192
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 200.
193
Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 604. For the seminal treatment of the
intersection of tort and property with regard to remedies, see Guido Calabresi and
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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multiple forms of resistance with which communities have
engaged.194
Moreover, the effects of this new regime are far-reaching in
scope. For example, in contrast to the strengthening of property
rights for some actors, multi-pronged strategies to attract foreign
investors have also led to land grabs and the displacement of many
communities across many countries in Africa. 195 In relation to
changes of the law to accommodate investors in mining in Mali, but
with insight that applies elsewhere as well, Hatcher argues that the
government has shifted from “owner/operator” to regulator to
“facilitator of foreign investment.” 196 The nature of the control
ceded here is wider than just with regard to the new mining code,
but rather “redefines” a new role of the state.197 In Mali and in other
places, while this legal reform did spur gold mining and public
revenue, the rights of village residents were left behind. The land
that villagers had occupied has been deliveredto the foreign mining
companies,198 food has become scarcer and more expensive,199 and
resources have not been re-distributed.200 Despite being the third
largest producer of gold in Africa, “one in five Malians live in
extreme poverty.”201 Implicit here is the state’s valuing of putting
194
See LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN
LEGALITY (Boaventura De Sousa Santos & César Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005);
RAJAGOPAL 2003, supra note 65.
195
For example, in 1991 and 1999, with support by the World Bank, Mali
“revised mining legislation to make the country more attractive to foreign
companies.” COTULA, supra note 5, at 89. This included numerous tax revisions,
streamlining of licensing, and also guaranteeing security of mineral title. Pascale
Hatcher, Mali: Rewriting The Mining Code Or Redefining The Role Of The State, in
REGULATING MINING IN AFRICA: FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 39, 43-46 (Bonnie Campbell ed.
2004).
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
COTULA, supra note 5.
199
Oxfam in Mali, OXFAM (2012), https://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-wedo/countries-we-work-in/mali. [https://perma.cc/H2BD-GMPB].
200
OXFAM, HIDDEN TREASURE: IN SEARCH OF MALI’S GOLD-MINING REVENUES
(2007), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/hidden-treasure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PCL6-ZM9P].
201
For Many Malians, Especially Those Uprooted by Conflict, Life is Fragile,
RELIEFWEB (Oct. 16, 2013), https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/many-maliansespecially-those-uprooted-conflict-life-fragile
[https://perma.cc/RRN6-M62T].
See also OXFAM, MALI: A NEW DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT? (2013), https://oi-files-d8-
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land to work towards its apparent highest use, which is no longer
subsidence agriculture in this example, but mining. Moreover,
across land grabs, one can observe the continuation of the narrative
around “empty land” as a way to invite and entice investors.
3. METHODOLOGY: SEEING PROPERTY THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL
LAW
From the relationship of conquest and imperialism to the more
recent methods of attracting foreign capital, the material influence
of transnational actors and ideas on the form and content of
property regimes has been powerful. Different conceptions of
property have been generated by the encounters described above.
A transnational approach to studying property turns our attention
not just to the actors, but also to the larger ideas regarding the nature
of “law” itself that crossed borders, took hold, and was adapted and
implemented.
What follows is a discussion of four lenses through which a
transnational analysis of property may be approached: the
“diffusion of law,” the plurality of law and its constituent norms,
postcolonial “everyday lived experiences” of urban property, and
law’s proliferation in terms of norm creation and norm
implementation beyond the state. This list is not exhaustive, but
rather, is meant to be suggestive of ways of analyzing how property
operates in particular geographies and eras, how dominant forms of
property regimes came to be and the implications for their
transplantation, and how the exercises of sovereignty that are
entwined with property can be revealed and scrutinized.

prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bn-mali-newdevelopment-contract-150513-en_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZV7-X2YN]. As of
2008, IMF still pushed for better property rights for investors. INT’L MONETARY
FUND, MALI: SELECTED ISSUES: IMF COUNTRY REPORT, NO. 08/286. (Aug. 2008),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08286.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34UZ-VUNF].
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3.1. The Diffusion of Transnational Property
Appreciating the complex ways in which particular ideas in
property travelled and took hold in various geographies202 means
not only seeing connections between property regimes that came
into contact with each other, but also how global (and ongoing)
moments of conquest, colonialism, development, and investment
processes shape conceptions of what constitutes property and who
gets to hold it. Diffusion worked differently in each of the phases
above. While in the discussion of conquest and colonialism, the acts
of states in the development of jurisprudence was observed; in the
turn to investment law, the power of private actors to make law in
closed, private arbitral settings was observed. Against this
backdrop, the question arises of how the connections between
property regimes—the travels and comingling of resources and
capital, people, and ideas that change how property is lived—can be
appreciated without reducing heterogeneous regimes into one
universal story of orthodox thinking in property. How should one
examine, consider, and compare, similarities, differences, influences
and mutual constitution without telling a story of inevitable
convergence towards Western conceptions of property rights? In
other words, does focusing on the “flow of capital” and the rising
power of private actors open up to risk of telling one universal story
of capital and property—that of imposition of Global North acting
on the Global South through colonies and spaces of development
and investment?
Postcolonial scholar Dipesh Chakrabarty unpacks the hidden
universalism in narratives of global capital,
No historical form of capital, however global its reach, can
ever be a universal . . . The universal, in that case, can only
exist as a place holder, its place always usurped by a
historical particular seeking to present itself as the
universal . . . .
Histories of capital, in that sense, cannot escape the politics
of the diverse ways of being human. Capital brings into
202
See, e.g., William Twining, Diffusion and Globalization Discourse, 47 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 507 (2006); DAVID A. WESTBROOK, NAVIGATORS OF THE CONTEMPORARY:
WHY ETHNOGRAPHY MATTERS (2009).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/2

2020]

Globalizing Property

667

every history some of the universal themes of the European
Enlightenment, but on inspection the universal turns out to
be an empty placeholder whose unstable outlines become
barely visible only when a proxy, a particular, usurps its
position in a gesture of pretension and domination.203
In short, then, the “globalization of capital is not the same as
capital’s universalization.”—meaning that the existence of
globalization is not an indication that the “universal and necessary
logic of capital,” per Marx has been realized.204 Rather, “singular
and unique histories” continue to “interrupt” and “defer” capital’s
“self-realization” and in doing so, serve as “grounds for claiming
historical difference.”205
Similarly, liberal conceptions of property regimes may look
universal, monolithic, neutral, 206 or coherent 207 or are often
presented as such. 208 But, in fact, what is revealed upon an
examination of the processes of property regime formation is that
that image of monolithic property is a myth. Laws and norms have
changed with time and place, have been adapted to fit the
circumstances in which they were meant to serve. Often, they have
served to perpetuate the interests of the stronger class of parties.
This recognition of historical contingency—of choice in how property
regimes are conceptualized—also reveals the double role 209 that
property can play, both enfranchising and disenfranchising,
simultaneously.
How then can one decenter that myth of universality and
coherence—and inevitability—in an account of the seemingly
apparent diffusion of property law across the globe? Focusing the
CHAKRABARTY, supra note 112, at 70.
CHAKRABARTY, supra note 112, at 71.
205
CHAKRABARTY, supra note 112, at xvii, 71.
206
See CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 14.
207
See FITZMAURICE, supra note 82 (attributing the expansion of certain forms
of common law to “cohering power of ideology,” which was needed to exercise
force (and for our purposes, property claims) over long distances).
208
For example, in the purported “best practices” in development orthodoxy
or investor protection practices explored above.
209
On law’s double role, see Robert A. Kagan, Bryant Garth, & Austin Sarat,
Introductory Essay: Facilitating and Domesticating Change: Democracy, Capitalism, and
Law’s Double Role in the 20th Century, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY (Austin
Sarat, Bryant Garth, & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2002).
203
204
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analysis on the historical contingencies of specific property doctrines
and their legal technologies might enable the beginning of
deconstructing the mythology around strong universal property
rights. Such technologies include the use of (i) formality, title, and
land records to attract capital from another jurisdiction, 210 (ii)
individual ownership and privatization in the name of progress,211
and (iii) land use and zoning to attract or maintain wealth—and
even the status of certain national 212 or racial groups 213 —within
jurisdictions. Each of these technologies have traveled well outside
their original spheres of influence and served many different
interests in their journeys. 214 Seeing property this way forces the
reconsideration of technologies that look technical and neutral as
technologies that have in fact perpetuated exclusion. It helps people
see how many property concepts emerged in certain moments to
protect then-present constellations of power and that were then
entrenched through time by codification into law and
transplantation elsewhere, with their history left behind.
Here, tracing the flows of capital, people, and ideas does not
mean a turn of gaze from domestic contexts into a white abstract
space somehow detached from the nation-state. In recognizing the
multi-sited origins and re-shapings of property concepts, it is also
important to acknowledge the interplay between multiple domestic
contexts. This interplay lies at the heart of transnational law
formation and involves shifting assemblages of actors and
institutions, events, ideas, norms, and processes.
As such,
transnational property law regimes are constituted as well by the
flows of capital and people between them, from which regulatory
claims are made and begin to take shape. Recognizing the dialectic
between global and local, and the interactions between multiple
“local sites” can reveal much about how law changes, and how it
See Gupta 2014, supra note 21.
See discussion of the taking of indigenous land in supra Part I.
212
See McAuslan 2015, supra note 39.
213
Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994).
214
For example, while it was shown above that property regimes designed to
attract foreign capital can be problematic enough, it should also be noted that the
formalization of property ownership through land titling programs has also been
used to both entrench gendered inequality of ownership, as well as to try to
alleviate it.
210
211
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reflects underlying societal values. From there, one might see not
just how materials things—capital, resources—flow among
geographies, but also how ideas and ways of life (and therefore legal
norms) are transformed through transnational travels, encounters,
and conflicts.
3.2. Plural Property
In recognizing the complexity of the diffusion of law globally,
engaging with the plurality of regimes and the multiplicity of
sources, as well as scales of legal relations, becomes crucial. In
proceeding in the project of developing a conceptual framework for
transnational property law, one enters into the realm where legal
doctrine not only meets and engages the sociology of law and legal
anthropology, but where one, in fact, discover that doctrine and
principle do not exist in complete isolation from the way in which
social sciences describe and scrutinize legal forms of ordering. After
investigating property’s transnational birth and evolution in old and
new conflictual encounters, this Article can now draw on social
sciences to help understand the nature, the consistency, and the
dynamics of the transnational property law regimes that it has been
tracing. That this undertaking is echoed in concurring scholarly
efforts to revive and to reconceptualize theories of governance,215
legal pluralism,216 and legal geography,217 is not surprising.
William Twining captures this endeavor as follows:
In law, it is especially important to distinguish between
different geographical levels of human relations and of legal
ordering of these relations—from outer space to the very
215
THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Rodney
Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
216
See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243
(2009); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2006);
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role of Law in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization and
Global Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle In India, 18 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 345 (2005).
217
THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE (Nicholas
Blomley, David Delaney, & Richard T. Ford eds., 2001); THE EXPANDING SPACES OF
LAW: A TIMELY LEGAL GEOGRAPHY (Irus Braverman, Nicholas Blomley, David
Delaney, & Alexandre Kedar eds. 2014).
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local, including intermediate levels, such as regions,
empires, diasporas, alliances, and other multinational
entities and groupings. These levels are not neatly nested in
concentric circles nor in hierarchies, nor are they static nor
clearly defined. A reasonably inclusive cosmopolitan
discipline of law needs to encompass all levels of legal
ordering, relations between these levels, and all important
forms of law including supra-state (e.g. international,
regional) and non-state law (e.g. religious law, transnational
law, chthonic law i.e. tradition/custom and various forms of
‘soft law’”).218
“[I]f one is concerned with legal ordering at all levels from
the very local to the intergalactic, including non-state local,
regional, transnational, and diasporic then clearly
borrowing, blending, and other forms of interaction can take
place at all levels and between different levels; interaction
can be vertical, horizontal, diagonal, or involve more
complex pathways . . . .219
Thinking about this concept of law against the examples
presented in Part II, it becomes even clearer how property regimes
are plural and spatial in nature. A fitting conceptual framework
exists in the form of legal pluralism, which the legal anthropologist
Sally Engle Merry defines as “a situation in which two or more legal
systems coexist in the same social field.”220 Postcolonial theory, with
its recognition of the multiplicity of legal regimes simultaneously
governing, offers an understanding of plurality that engages with
the complex entanglement of legal systems—not only are they
operating simultaneously but they also are mutually constitutive.
Postcolonial theorists also offer understandings of how law and
norms emanate from non-state actors through a multiplicity of
processes. In that vein, the legal sociologist Boaventura de Sousa
Santos conceives of “the phenomenological counterpart of legal
pluralism” through the introduction of a concept of “interlegality,”
defined as “the conception of different legal spaces superimposed,
218
William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM 11 (2004).
219
Id. at 13 [internal citations omitted, emphasis added.]
220
Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 870 (1988)
(internal citations omitted).
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interpenetrated, and mixed in our minds as much as in our actions,
in occasions of qualitative leaps or sweeping crises in our life
trajectories as well as in the dull routine of eventless everyday
life.” 221 By employing the concept of interlegality, one sees, for
example, not only the production of law through colonial
encounters, but also are able to carry forward that encounter as an
ongoing moment of law creation, diffusion,222 and transformation in
our legal analysis.
From there, a world view comes into view—both
geographically, and across time—not a universalistic conception of
one legal regime but rather, a global or transnational legal pluralistic
sense of the larger geographic and societal frames that are relevant
to legal analysis. Property regimes, as noted in the opening of this
Article, are not just based ‘locally’ or in one nation-state, as
evidenced by the overlapping spheres of pluralistic legal systems
and jurisdiction. This implies that instead of studying legal regimes
or even legal pluralism within a state context, one should appreciate
a global vision of multiple legal systems interacting and forming
laws and norms through those encounters and from images of
governance coming from both “below”223 as well as “above”.224
As the lived experiences of people around property, in
particular, demonstrate, the multiple regimes that govern may be
‘official’ or ‘unofficial’, formal or informal, written or not written—
coming from the state or not. Indeed, for legal pluralists, even
“[s]tate law itself is multiple.”225 As Martha-Marie Kleinhans and
Roderick A. Macdonald explain, this “multiplicity is both internal
221
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern
Conception of Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 297-98 (1987).
222
Note that from this view, that diffusion would be multi-directional and
nonlinear. See EVE DARIAN-SMITH & PHILIP C. MCCARTY, THE GLOBAL TURN:
THEORIES, RESEARCH DESIGNS, AND METHODS FOR GLOBAL STUDIES (2017) (discussing
methods of global research and advocating a holistic approach to understanding
contemporary global issues).
223
Sousa Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 194; RAJAGOPAL 2003, supra
note 65.
224
See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.15 (2005) (arguing
that contemporary pluralist imaginations are based on a limited view of the law
and proposing an alternative image of law).
225
Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Rod A. Macdonald, What is a Critical Legal
Pluralism?, 12 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 25, 31 (1997).
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and external.”226 Internally, it can be found in “unitary systems that
referentially incorporate local custom and commercial practice as
part of the official legal regime in explicitly federal systems” as well
as “where diverse administrative agencies compete with each other
and with different judicial bodies to regulate conduct[.]” 227
Externally, multiplicity arises “in every situation involving what
jurists conventionally label “choice of law” in the conflicts of laws,”
operating through “multiple bodies of law, with multiple
institutional reflections and multiple sources of legitimacy.”228
In the examples above, that multiplicity comes not just from
interactions of conflicting property law regimes, but also from the
intersection of property, international law, finance, immigration,
and regimes of other sovereigns.229 Each of these features are found
in multiple forms within the nation-state, between nation-states, and
crucially, from the actions and norms held by non-state corporate,
civil society, and local and global entities and actors. One can see
through the examples of investment law and property rights, how,
while the boundaries between practice areas may be breaking down,
there is also increased fragmentation 230 and the rise of highly
specialized regulatory constellations.231
3.3. Everyday Lives of Urban Property in the Global South
This leads to the third implication of this globalized orientation:
the opening of theoretical space in which to rethink property
regimes in terms of their origins and evolution, their “life” and
Id. at 31.
Id. at 31.
228
Id. at 31-32 (internal citations omitted). On objections to the move away
from state law and fears for the Rule of Law, see id. at 32-34.
229
JOHN BORROWS, CANADA’S INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION (2010) (discussing the
nature and sources of Canadian law and determining that the Canada’s constitution
is incomplete without further inclusion and acceptance of Indigenous legal
traditions); John Borrows, Indigenous Legal Traditions in Canada, 19 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 167 (2005) (recognizing Canada’s need to more effectively recognize
Indigenous legal traditions).
230
On the fragmentation of public international law, see Martti Koskenniemi
& Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of international law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J.
INT’L. L. 553 (2002).
231
See Zumbansen 2012, supra note 24, at 191.
226
227
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functional dimensions “in action.” 232 Moving from historical
examples of encounters forward, this Section sets out to locate the
sites of conflicts over property in the City.
Cities—where property claims to scarce resources play out with
a particularly high pitch and where the investment flows discussed
above are landing unevenly around the world—are fascinating and
intriguing regulatory and epistemic spaces in that regard, 233
particularly through the analytical lenses offered by urban
sociologists studying cities in the Global South or “from the
South.”234
This literature can be seen as part of broader methodological and
normative efforts to re-think an array of disciplinary and theoretical
frameworks and “from the South.”235 As Ananya Roy has argued,
First World conceptions of cities are so inadequate for Third World
cities that it is not that they need reconfiguring, but that the episteme
itself should be informed by the experiences of the Third World, as
232
Roscoe Pound, Law in Action and Law in Books, 44 AM. L. REV. 12-36 (1910)
(discussing the divergence between legal theory and the practical application of
black-letter law).
233
As Coll Thrush points out in his immensely readable and informed account
of indigenous life in London, cities are also places that are seen as having little
Indigenous “presence and even less significance,” and so have been used to
reinforce historicist and racist binaries of modern/not modern. See COLL THRUSH,
INDIGENOUS LONDON: NATIVE TRAVELERS AT THE HEART OF EMPIRE (Yale U. Press,
2016). In the past several decades, the “Global City” paradigm has come to
prominence. The Global City, often associated with Saskia Sassen, refers to “a set
of global command and control centers that are connected in transnationally
networked hierarchies of economic, demographic and sociocultural relationships.”
SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBAL CITY 4 (Princeton U. Press 2d ed. 1991). That paradigm has
been invaluable in demonstrating how these transformations, regulation,
information, capital, and production processes have to be understood as global
processes subject to multi-layered regulatory regimes and with uneven spatialized
landings. Moreover, studying the City against this political economic background
further reveals the state’s growing reliance on private authority as it seeks to create
an ever more amenable playing field for global investors, while significantly
weakening democratic forms of accountability on local, national and global levels.
On the idea of “private authority,” see A. Claire Cutler et al., The Contours and
Significance of Private Authority in International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. (A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, & Tony Porter eds.,
1999).
234
See, e.g., Jennifer Robinson & Ananya Roy, Debate on Global Urbanisms and
the Nature of Urban Theory, 40 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RES. 181 (2016) (discussing the
decentralization and reframing of the concept of the urban space).
235
Jean L. Comaroff & John Comaroff, Theory from the South: Or, How EuroAmerica is Evolving Toward Africa, 22 ANTHROPOLOGICAL F. 113 (2012).
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well as the First.236 In these accounts, the Global South is not just as
a place that was acted upon by colonial and other Global North
forces, but rather as a diverse constellation of locations that generate
theoretical categories. In that sense, this literature both affirms and
critiques the concept of the Global City by revealing the diversity of
modes of city participation in the global economy.237
From the project of building an understanding of transnational
property, this re-orientation of research could mean engaging with
a plurality of property regimes as they operate in people’s everyday
lives, particularly those living in cities in Global South. This
approach could help reveal the flows of resources, power
imbalances, and perpetuation of colonial logics, 238 all of which
demonstrate how property has been conceived and how
transnational encounters have been instrumental in that conception.
What follows are several brief illustrations of the categories and
frameworks that might be re-thought in relation to property.
Perhaps not entirely surprising given the massive development
projects of the previous several decades, many of these urban
sociological engagements encourage new thinking around the
concept of ‘infrastructure’. For example, Swati Chattopadhyay,
writing about Indian cities with particular reference to Calcutta,
reconceptualizes infrastructure to include popular uses of city spaces
(such as cricket and religious ceremonies). These uses are re-read in
her account as political expressions.239 In a comparable vein, but
with focus on African cities, Ambreena Manji explores what might
constitute an effective ‘right to the city’ in the context of the uneven
236
Ananya Roy, Who’s Afraid of Postcolonial Theory?, 40 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L
RES. 200, 202 (2016) (arguing that Eurocentrism in discussions of the urban space
precludes multiple concepts of “the urban” and other understandings of political
economy). See also Ananya Roy, The 21st-Century Metropolis: New Geographies of
Theory. 43 REG’L STUD. 819 (2009) (discussing Eurocentrism in dominant theories
about global city-regions and the consequential exclusion of “metropolitan
modernities”).
237
For a seminal critique of the concept of Global Cities and an alternative
conception of the place of cities in global economic structures, see JENNIFER
ROBINSON, ORDINARY CITIES: BETWEEN MODERNITY AND DEVELOPMENT (Routledge
2006).
238
See LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds.,
1999).
239
See SWATI CHATTOPADHYAY, UNLEARNING THE CITY: INFRASTRUCTURE IN A
NEW OPTICAL FIELD (U. of Minn. Press 2012) (questioning the traditional concept of
the urban space and advocating for the need for a new urban vocabulary).
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benefits and inconveniences of highway construction in Nairobi.240
AbdouMaliq Simone writes of the remaking of infrastructure and
space through mixed uses of land—in his words, “improvised
livelihoods in mixed-up districts”—and interdependence and
isolation in Jakarta. 241 With reference to Johannesburg, he
reconceptualizes infrastructure as people—infrastructure in this
case being the flexible, creative, and resourceful economic
collaborations among otherwise marginalized residents that, like
more the more traditional sort of infrastructure, serve as “a platform
providing for and reproducing life in the city.”242
These projects raise numerous questions for the
responsiveness243 of property regimes—those that are established in
these jurisdictions as well as those on the ‘outside’ that interact with
them. Decisions around who gets to have a say in the built
environment—in the spaces that order daily life for societies—
involve often procedural and technical local governmental forms of
governance. Decisions around who should have access to that built
environment—in short, for whom it is built—find their outcomes'
codification in property regimes. Decisions around who will have
access to that built environment—around how title and rights to use
built environments will be allocated—may involve seemingly
mundane applications of formal property law, but this Article has
shown how the colonial and conquest legacies valuing a hierarchy
of uses of space remain powerfully imprinted in current property
thought.
Infrastructural growth—material and re-imagined—is of course
just one dimension of the massive transformations undergone by
cities in the Global South in the past few decades. Other dimensions
240 See Ambreena Manji, Bulldozers, Homes and Highways: Nairobi and the Right
to the City 42 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 206 (2015).
241
See ABDOUMALIQ SIMONE, CITY LIFE FROM JAKARTA TO DAKAR: MOVEMENTS AT
THE CROSSROADS (Routledge 2010) (challenging the traditional analyses of urban life
by focusing on cities in Africa and South East Asia, notably Chapter four).
242
AbdouMaliq Simone, People As Infrastructure: Intersecting Fragments In
Johannesburg, 16 PUB. CULTURE 407, 407-08 (2004).
243
PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION:
TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (Transaction Publishers 1978) (discussing jurisprudential
issues in a social science project). On reflexivity, see Gunther Teubner, Substantive
and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC. REV. 239 (1983); Peter Zumbansen,
Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive
Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 769 (2008).
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include the rise of middle classes 244 , their notable heterogeneity,
massive urbanization,245 and the ensuing displacement and forced
evictions.246 Each of these dimensions brings with them new ways
of life that are often structured in some way by property regimes
and transactions—whether through consumerism, new household
configurations with new homes to match, 247 or new patterns of
labour and transport as well as access to resources 248 and daily
security of life and livelihoods. These transformations have driven
the reconceptualization of cities and the idea of the urban,
244
Homi Kharas, The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries, OECD
DEVELOPMENT
CENTRE
WORKING
PAPERS
(2010),
https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/5kmmp8lncrns-en.pdf?expires=1579799888&id=
id&accname=guest&checksum=530556FC4878DC7DD2E91241E7C97C73
[https://perma.cc/2AX4-PME2] (examining the establishment of the middle class
in developing countries, specifically, the role of the middle class in current
economic thought); Moses Naim, The Uprising of the Global Middle Class, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 25, 2017) (discussing the economic impact of the rise of the middle class in
developing countries); On the global middle class, situated from Morocco, see S.
COHEN, SEARCHING FOR A DIFFERENT FUTURE: THE RISE OF A GLOBAL MIDDLE CLASS IN
MOROCCO. (2004).
Regarding Jakarta, see AbdouMaliq Simone, Cities Of
Uncertainty: Jakarta, The Urban Majority, And Inventive Political Technologies, 30
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 243 (2013). Regarding Latin America, see Francisco H. G.
Ferreira, Julian Messina, Jamele Rigolini, Luis-Felipe Lopez-Calva, Maria Ana
Lugo, & Renos Vakis, Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Latin American Middle
Class, WORLD BANK PUBLICATIONS (2012), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
1c5f/6dc583aef0d314312790c4ff00c22140d86b.pdf?_ga=2.256296139.1528751496.15
79800024-1657322843.1579800024
[https://perma.cc/WH4N-DE4Q];
LATIN
AMERICA’S EMERGING MIDDLE CLASSES: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (J. Dayton-Johnson
ed., 2015). On the uncertainty associated with these transformations, again see
Moses Naim, The Uprising of the Global Middle Class, ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2017); see
also MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS (2006).
245
See generally THE NEW BLACKWELL COMPANION TO THE CITY (Gary Bridge &
Sophie Watson eds., Wiley-Blackwell 2011) (discussing the impact of increased
urbanization); Neil Brenner & Christian Schmid, Planetary Urbanization, in URBAN
CONSTELLATIONS (M. Gandy ed., 2012) (arguing that within the context of
urbanisation, political-economic spaces should not be treated as discrete and
distinct types of settlement).
246
See GAUTAM BHAN, IN THE PUBLIC’S INTEREST: EVICTIONS, CITIZENSHIP, AND
INEQUALITY IN CONTEMPORARY DELHI (U. of Ga. Press 2016) (discussing planned
illegalities, spatial illegality and evictions and the politics of governance n
contemporary Delhi).
247
For example, in India, the rise of nuclear family households.
248 See NIKHIL ANAND, HYDRAULIC CITY: WATER AND THE INFRASTRUCTURES OF
CITIZENSHIP IN MUMBAI (2017); see also SIMONE 2010, supra note 241 (discussing a
resourceful daily life in the face of “carbon-driven exigencies of infrastructural
transformations,” opening up possibilities for the remaking of societal relationships
and politics in egalitarian ways).
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particularly in the Global South, as “megacities,” “world”/“worldclass,” 249 “spectacular,” 250 “ordinary,” 251 “entangled,” 252
“bourgeois,”253 “hydraulic,” 254 “slumdog,”255 “yet to come,”256 and
as sites of “pirate modernity,”257 to name a few.
Who—or what—is governing these societal, economic, and
political transformations and their implications for the use of city
space? As the accounts in Part II and the discussion of diffusion and
plurality above attempted to demonstrate, sites of governance—and
therefore sites of agency—are diffuse and overlapping. Such sites
can often be found in a constellation of state, sub-state, and non-state
actors from communities to professional groups to civil society
groups. It has also been shown how the governance of given fields
of law is dependent on ever-evolving webs of various fields of law
and regulation. In property’s case, for example, investment,
development lending, immigration, and finance operate
simultaneously on different scales of jurisdiction—local, national,
transnational, with ongoing translation, adaptation, and fusion
between them.258

249
See WORLDING CITIES: ASIAN EXPERIMENTS AND THE ART OF BEING GLOBAL
(Ananya Roy & Aihwa Ong eds., 2011).
250
See IPSITA CHATTERJEE, SPECTACULAR CITIES: RELIGION, LANDSCAPE, AND THE
DIALECTICS OF GLOBALIZATION (2016).
251
See Robinson & Roy 2016, supra note 234.
252
See SANJAY SRIVASTAVA, ENTANGLED URBANISM: SLUM, GATED COMMUNITY,
AND SHOPPING MALL IN DELHI AND GURGAON (2015).
253
See PARTHA CHATTERJEE, Are Indian Cities Becoming Bourgeois At Last?, in
THE POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED: REFLECTIONS ON POPULAR POLITICS IN MOST OF THE
WORLD 131 (2004).
254
See ANAND, supra note 248.
255
See Ananya Roy, Slumdog Cities: Rethinking Subaltern Urbanism, 35 INT’L J.
URB. & REG’L RES. 223, 225 (2011).
256
See ABDOUMALIQ SIMONE, FOR THE CITY YET TO COME: CHANGING AFRICAN
LIFE IN FOUR CITIES (2004).
257
See RAVI SUNDARAM, PIRATE MODERNITY: DELHI’S MEDIA URBANISM (2010).
258
For a gripping journalistic narrative of the self-governance of a slum in
Bombay in the context of urbanization, construction, and increased official security
state, see KATHERINE BOO, BEHIND THE BEAUTIFUL FOREVERS: LIFE, DEATH, AND HOPE
IN A MUMBAI UNDERCITY (photo. reprt. 2014) (2012). For a rich account of the
transformations of the idea of the local—in this case Bogota—within constellations
of international law and development policy, see LUIS ESLAVA, LOCAL SPACE,
GLOBAL LIFE: THE EVERYDAY OPERATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
(2015).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

678

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:3

More specifically, then, how has the governance of urban
property in cities in the Global South transformed in this context of
globalization? Sketching a picture of sites of governance of space
and of who has access to which city spaces and for what purposes is
necessarily complex. For example, in writing about Calcutta, Partha
Chatterjee tells of the changing nature of neighborhood public
spaces and institutions—parks, tea shops, markets and much
more—established by the wealthy and middle classes in the 1950s,
and often very diverse in terms of class, religion, language and
ethnicity. 259 Poorer residents lived in close quarters with the
wealthy, sharing patron-client relationships, often working in
industrial factories owned by the wealthy. 260 Democracy and
development projects of the 1970s and 80s brought a number of
accommodations to alleviate urban poverty, including improved
access to sanitation, education, and healthcare for poorer
residents. 261
However, with post-industrialization and the
increasing disengagement of the middle classes from urban politics,
these neighborhoods have become much more segregated—by class
as well as religion/language/ethnicity—and much more
disinclined to support the lives and livelihoods of various classes
and interests.262 These changes are reflected in property and landrelated law, as wealthy and middle classes increasingly bring
actions to move poor residents away from what they perceive as
their living spaces and resources. 263 The poor, while having
increased access to some forms of social welfare at times, had never
been treated as full citizens with respect to their access to property
or neighborhood space, as it evidently would have threatened “the
entire structure of legally held property.”264 And so, even while the
poor sometimes gained access to some facilities and benefits
through ongoing negotiations with separate government agencies
and on a case-by-case basis, such access was not regularized across
See Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 133.
See Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 132.
261
See Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 135.
262
See Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 139-142.
263
See Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253; see also Gupta 2014, supra note 21.
264
Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 137. For a discussion around cloudy land
title in India with regard to all socio-economic classes, see Priya S. Gupta, Ending
Finders, Keepers: The Use of Title Insurance to Alleviate Uncertainty in Land Holdings in
India, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 63 (2010).
259
260
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populations, so as to prevent “jeopardizing the overall structure of
legality and property.” 265 That lack of recognition of the poor as
rights-bearing citizens has enabled the judiciary more recently to
sanction the clearance of slums and residents who live on pavement
and in encampments with little alternative accommodation.266
This account further highlights the need for a relevant account
of law to go beyond purported formality to appreciate the degree of
informality and plurality that governs the “regime” in question. It
is here again that an understanding of “property law” requires one
to draw on socio-legal accounts and on ethnographies of “everyday
lives” to effectively understand societal ordering with, through and
around property.
With the help of more differentiated,
interdisciplinary tools it becomes possible to gain an understanding
of who actually has access to ownership, who in reality gets to hold
title and makes decisions regarding land within households,267 and
what the true circumstances are around gender access to ownership
and use. Based on a differentiated, ethnographically-based critique,
it might be a better position to assess what kinds of uses are
prioritized in different, specialized, and increasingly fragmented
regulatory areas. Finally, it might allow a clearer picture of the
underlying demographics, and which populations have security of
use of city space and, crucially, how this changes over time. In an
effort to better understand the shifting constellations of actors who
exercise agency around property, this would also prompt a look at
policy and legal entrepreneurs who shift ownership patterns and
access to resources. Examples of such entrepreneurs might include
title aggregators who work to assemble large plots of land ready for
re-development, immigration lawyers who work to secure visas in
exchange for investment from abroad, or others who fulfill similar
societal positions.
The account also highlights the need to engage with multiple
fields and regulatory areas at the same time, and against the
background
of
larger
political-economic
and
societal
Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 137.
See Gupta 2014, supra note 21.
267
On the legal nature of the household, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE
HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH (2008). For a critical account
situated during the Greek debt crisis of 2010, see Philomila Tsoukala, Household
Regulation and European Integration: The Family Portrait of a Crisis, 63 AM. J. COMP. L.
747 (2015).
265
266
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transformations. Evolving priorities and values involving property
are, at the very least, found within the following regulatory areas:
foreign investment (including who can invest in real estate and in
what forms real estate can be built; tax and tax credits; local
governance and regulations), zoning, sanitation, utilities (including
the politics of which residents get access to reliable water and
electricity), the use of law to treat homeless populations as
“nuisance” 268 or “illegal” 269 , who gets to serve on local councils,
property sales and transactions (the process of assigning and
registering title, mortgage and insurance), inheritance, and the
nature of constitutional rights involving property and the politics
around their exercise.
What does this account do to liberal property theory and its
reliance on formality, records, delineated and individual ownership
and separation of uses by space? This account presents its own
theory, grounded in its own experiences. It also offers a powerful
critique to the often-assumed universality of common law property.
In short, and in reference to the historical moments and property
doctrines presented in Part II, it puts pressure on the reality of such
concepts as formality and title; just exercises of land appropriation
and eminent domain; the implicit hierarchy in the concept of ‘use’;
individual ownership and rights; and the exercise of sovereignty
over space and residents; as well as entitlements that accompany
invasion and occupation. It also raises broader questions around
how law comes into being, who exercises agency, whose interests
are represented and why and how property is actually used and
understood.

268
See generally D. ASHER GHERTNER, RULE BY AESTHETICS: WORLD-CLASS CITY
MAKING IN DELHI (2015) (discussing the treatment—and non-treatment—of
homeless populations by government officials in formal and informal actions).
269
See Usha Ramanathan, Illegality and The Urban Poor, 41 ECON. & POL. WKLY.
3193 (2006) (tracking the shift of the judiciary in classifying the urban poor’s
housing crisis as an issue of legality as opposed to one of fundamental rights). For
a powerful account of the “criminalization of poverty” in the United States, see
Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643
(2009).
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3.4. Actors and Encounters (and even Law) Beyond the State
[T]he state has lost its exclusive role in the global sphere. It
has not become unimportant—some states have arguably
increased their power and their importance—but it has lost
its independence. States have become, to use concept that
Keohane and Nye popularized, interdependent; their role
depends on and in turn influences that of other states, and
much of their activity now happens in cooperation with
other states . . . [I]t matters also that states have become
disaggregated,
as
Anne-Marie
Slaughter
has
demonstrated—rather than viewing the state as a uniform
actor we should look at the actions of its different agencies,
which are sometimes in conflict with each other. Moreover,
we must learn to look not just at states as lawmakers but also
to focus on the significant lawmaking by non-state actors—
arbitrators, institutions (so-called rule formulating agencies),
multinational corporations, ethnic communities, and so
on.270
The three themes that Ralf Michaels highlights resonate with a
transnational approach to property:
interdependent states,
disaggregation, and lawmaking by non-state actors. First, while the
state continues to exist and play a significant role in property
regimes, a transnational approach to property would not be
centered around national or international law that emanates from
only the state and would recognize the influence of other states and
localities in the formation of property regimes.
Second, a
disaggregated approach trains scholars to see the multiple levels of
co-existing jurisdiction over land—local (which might be rural or
urban or both), state, national, as well as executive, legislative, and
judicial.
More provocatively, appreciating the state as
disaggregated also opens the possibility to see the conflicts of values
in different fields of law that intersect with land—environmental,
land use, human rights for example—as they play out through
agency wars, judicial opinions, and conflicting social movements.

270
Ralf Michaels, Transnationalizing Comparative Law, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. &
COMP. L. 352, 355 (2016).
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This lens also turns our attention to actors and processes for
lawmaking beyond the state, recognizing that the state has a huge
part, but acknowledging that law is also created through encounters
between various actors. Sometimes these encounters are between
states, but may also include individuals, colonizers, development
consultants, arbitrators, investors, and corporations to name a few.
Property regimes are a result of myriad encounters, failed and
successful claims, relationships, evolutions, and transactions. This
approach attempts to shift our focus from the already-existing
property regimes to the genealogies of how such regimes came
about, in particular how transnational encounters beyond the state
shaped the formation of such regimes. In addition to reflecting how
property is lived in the everyday sense, this broader perspective of
property in transnational context also aligns with the reality of how
norms are produced today through privatization, deregulation, and
other forms of the ceding of public authority to private actors.271 In
this age of globalization and a financialized form of capitalism,272 it
seems even more essential to use legal analytic tools that reflect that
reality.
In that sense, looking beyond the state opens our frame much
wider than the relative neatness of (relatively formal) lawmaking by
nonstate actors. It also brings an engagement with what might be
considered “non-legal” 273 —with the informal, the messy, the
undefined, the slow and nonlinear processes of formalization, the
extralegal, and the everyday discussed in the Section above. In other
words, looking at the operations of property regimes beyond the
state also underscores the necessity of engaging with lived
experiences of property in trying to appreciate how regimes are
established, operated, transformed, and which purposes they serve
(e.g. how regimes actually govern property). From this perspective,
it becomes fairly obvious that one’s analytical frame must embrace
sociological, anthropological, political economic, and other accounts
of property-related circumstances. (Without that expansion, how
See Hall & Biersteker, supra note 215; Cutler, supra note 233.
See GIOVANNI ARRIGHI, THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY: MONEY, POWER, AND
THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIMES (1994); see also GRETA R. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS:
THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE RISE OF FINANCE (2011); COSTAS LAPAVITSAS, PROFITING
WITHOUT PRODUCING: HOW FINANCE EXPLOITS US ALL (2014).
273
See Peter Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL
THEORY 141, 145 (2010).
271
272
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could one appreciate the legacy of the stretching of terra nullius on
indigenous peoples and even in other circumstances around the
world, or the significance of state sovereignty and democratic
tensions in the system of investment-related arbitration as dispute
resolution?) Despite the methodological shift in research 274 and
even judging275 of property regimes toward an interdisciplinary and
ethnographic approach, orthodox property thought seems stuck in
the transplantation of universal ideals for regime design across time
and geography.
CONCLUSION: WHAT IS PROPERTY AND WHO GETS TO HAVE IT
This Article has attempted to show how common law property
thought is a product of transnational encounters, and to offer several
interdisciplinary ways of analyzing property law in transnational
context. This orientation towards transnational examination would
more squarely address how certain entrenched concepts in property
law are used in different geographies and times in ways that
perpetuate inequality through normalization of the status quo
distributions of wealth. Several such concepts are discussed herein.
First, even, what is considered property?276 How did certain things
come to be considered property and in more than one jurisdiction,
no less? What does it mean for something to be ‘property’ in a legal
sense? That is, how is the definition of property, in part, a reflection
of encounters and ensuing legal regimes? Both the object of
property and also the rights that attach can be appreciated more
fully in transnational context.
Second, the justifications around what a property regime should
promote (underlying the question of ‘why do societies have

274
See DARIAN-SMITH & MCCARTY, supra note 222; Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels
& Annelise Riles, Transdisciplinary Conflict of Laws Foreword: Cavers's Double Legacy,
71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2008).
275
One could consider the Brandeis briefs as an early example of this
phenomenon. For a more recent example, see ALBIE SACHS, THE STRANGE ALCHEMY
OF LIFE AND LAW (2011).
276
For American perspectives on what is considered property, see LAURA S.
UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER (2003); STUART
BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN (2011).
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property?’)277 have played out in various circumstances where ‘uses’
of property were prioritized, as we saw above with conquest and
colonialism. Justifications have varied over time and place—wealth
production, agriculture, development, economic growth,
marketability—and tell a powerful story of shifting priorities and
underlying values in societies, as well as the circulation of those
values and how they can be embedded in property regimes.
Closely related to these justifications for allocation of property
and success of claims based on use are the concepts such as progress278
and modernity279 that have driven the development of certain aspects
of property regimes. These concepts have different meanings and
associations in different times and places. They are highly
contingent upon their circumstances and they do different work in
different places, and yet, some patterns emerge in how they are used
to drive property regimes.
Once one attends to the patterns in the purposes that property
serve—patterns that exist transnationally—it is possible to then
draw connections between segments of populations in very
different geographies. For example, the extensive government
support in the United States for the building of suburbia post-War
with resources for construction, real estate lending, as well as
infrastructure such as roads and utilities were part of a larger
narrative of progress and development that was meant to bring
along certain kinds of citizens. This might be considered in
connection with the rhetorical support for the middle class as
progress for society with more recent discourse in India that
celebrates the urban middle class as modern citizens. Both
circumstances involve vast governmental resources that structure
and support private industry and consumerism within powerful
rhetorical values of national progress and entrance into world-stage
of politics and geopolitical power, and that draw in citizens as
dutiful consumers who through their (literal) buy-in, help move
their country forward. The point here is not to universalize, but to

277
See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY THEORY (2012) (providing an overview of the major, modern theories of
property); ALEXANDER 1998, supra note 30.
278
See, e.g., Purdy 2007, supra note 64.
279
See, e.g., CHAKRABARTY, supra note 112.
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see transnational flows of ideas and influence and to understand the
pull of progress and modernity,280 in particular.
Finally, and again, the question of ‘who gets to have it?’ is affected
by the jurisdictional border crossings of these notions. Ideas of use
and modernity are closely related to who is a legitimate holder and
user of property and to which lifestyles should be given space to
operate. This much is clear from the discussion of indigenous
people and their uses of land in the United States, Canada, and
Australia, casting such populations and uses as not “modern”
enough to justify their occupancy. It is also present in the vast webs
of regulations that both explicitly and implicitly excluded black
people and other racial minorities from homeownership in
American suburbia when it was built281 and through and after the
Financial Crisis of 2008.282 Much of the power of these situations
resides in what is cast as ‘normal’ and as ‘desirable’. Slow shifts in
what kinds of uses—and what kinds of occupants—are legitimate
are not articulated as changes in law or precedent, but rather as
obvious justifications not in need of further explanation. Superiority
of race as well as caste, religion, and class, depending on the
circumstance, gets embedded in judicial and societal discourse and
passed on generationally.283
This method of analysis reveals the private accumulation of
sovereignty through these processes. Not only would this be
necessary for a case such as Mabo—directly within the context of
conquest—but also for more mundane, seemingly local cases
regarding land use, landlord-tenant law, or the like. With regards
to the latter, the values that informed which claim should win (and
in some sense which claim was more legitimate) might be less takenfor-granted if the power structures that shaped the applicable
property regimes were recognized more explicitly.
We see through this analysis that the border-crossing operations
of the notion of property and property regimes are not new, but
280
On the relationship between modernity and globalization, see ARJUN
APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996);
ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN THE LATE
MODERN AGE (1991); FITZPATRICK 2002, supra note 35.
281
See, e.g., FREUND, supra note 111; KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER:
THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1987).
282
See, e.g., Gupta 2014, supra note 21.
283
See, e.g., WILLIAMS 2005, supra note 64.
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rather, adopting a wider theoretical lens brings property law’s often
violent creation, usurpation and consolidation into sharper relief.
Appreciating property in global context and as a process of
transnationalization of law lends its own insights into how ideas
around transnational property have been present for centuries. This
implies that “transnational property,” though not called that, has
influenced the development of common law (as well as other forms
of law) in a constitutive way from inception.
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